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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
Modernist and/or avant-garde theatre turned its face towards language of the body 
to set theatre free from representing the text. One of the characteristics of avant-garde 
theatre is its emphasis on unconscious, instincts, dreams and thus on what is primitive. 
Theatre which is experienced physically, in other words, through the body, can touch 
the primitive side of human-being. Artaud considers physicality as an important aspect 
to find the unique voice of theatre as an art  form.  Artaud searched for a theatrical 
language which is free from the intentions of the author and text.   He asserted that 
instead of representing another language, for instance the language of literature, theatre 
should find its own language.  The language of the body was underlined as one of the 
ways to  free  theatre  from the text.  Artaud asserted that  “speech before  words” and 
physicality which cannot be expressed through words should be found. Thus, Artaud 
assumes that language of the body is equal to the physicality of the body and that the 
body and language are two distinct categories; there is a physicality which cannot be 
expressed through the words.  All of these assumptions bring three important questions: 
where  the  body starts  and language  ends  or  vice  versa,  are  the  body and language 
distinct categories, can the physicality of the body be involved in language.  Language 
of the body was frequently perceived as being equivalent to the physicality of the body. 
This perception considers the body and language as two distinct, separate categories.  It 
is as if on the one hand, there is a written text and on the other hand, the physicality of 
the body.  In a way, non-representational theatre was thought as if it frees itself from the 
text  through the  body.   The  fundamental  distinction  here  is  between  the  body and 
language.  Beckett, in his plays, puts forward the fact that the physical existence of the 
body is not necessary for involving the physicality of the body on stage by blurring the 
boundary  between the  body and language.   In  other  words,  as  well  as  language  is 
presented as involving the physicality of the body, the body is portrayed as a textual 
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production by Beckett.   After all,  what does it  mean to free theatre from literature? 
Since where the text starts and body ends or vice versa cannot be strictly determined, 
searching for a theatrical language by means of freeing it from the text is not the most 
convenient method. 
There is  difference between the performativity  in  everyday life  and in  theatre 
which can be explained through the theatrical frame.  Other than constructing itself, 
Beckett's texts put themselves forward as a construction.  The texts stage themselves 
through performing themselves as a construction. Inspired by Deleuze, one can say that 
Beckett's  texts  do not  mean and represent  anything definite,  but  act  themselves out 
through making meaning and representation indefinite and/or impossible.  Analyzing 
schizophrenic language is necessary to give an example for what it means for a text to 
act  itself out.   In this thesis, I  analyze schizophrenic language through its power in 
blurring the distinction between the body and language.  What comes from the inside, 
the  body,  and  the  outside,  language,  gets  blurred  in  schizophrenic  language.   The 
physicality  and  materiality  of  language  as  creating  meaning  and  meaning  as  being 
physical  and  material  reveal  themselves  through  schizophrenic  language.  The 
distinction  between  materiality  and  language  cannot  be  attained  in  schizophrenic 
language.  By  making  materiality  and  meaning  “function  together”,  schizophrenic 
language acts itself out rather than meaning and representing anything definite. 
 The  poststructuralist  theorists  are  significant  to  refer  to  discuss  how  it  is 
impossible to draw a strict boundary between the body and language.  First of all, the 
constructive  and performative  aspects  of  language  together  with  the  corporeality  of 
language  discussed  by  Derrida  and  Deleuze  are  necessary  to  refer  to.   After  that, 
schizophrenic language will be analyzed in detail.
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Chapter 2
A POSTSTRUCTURALIST CRITIQUE: LANGUAGE, REPRESENTATION AND 
REALITY
The distinction between representative and performative aspects of language can 
be  delineated  with  reference  to  Derrida's  and  Deleuze's  theories.   Despite  many 
differences between these two poststructuralist theorists, they both oppose  the belief 
that language represents things. On the contrary, they emphasize how it constructs or 
makes things possible. Derrida asserts that meaning and subjectivity are produced by 
the  endless  play  of  signification  and  that  everything  is  subjected  to  the  system of 
differences. According to  Deleuze, there is no origin and first term to be repeated, but 
the repetition of differences makes things appear.  For both philosophers, things emerge 
as the result of the endless play of signification or as the result  of the repetition of 
differences.   According  to  Deleuze,  linguistic  differences  is  one  of  the  many other 
'imperceptible'  differences  while  Derrida uses the concept  'difference'  primarily in a 
linguistic context.
I  will  follow  Derrida'  category  of  the  'Western  philosophical  tradition'  while 
referring to Aristotle's and Plato's conceptualizations of 'representation'.  For Derrida, 
thinking through presence,  “metaphysics of presence”, is basically the first thing to be 
questioned  while  analyzing  the  Western  traditon  of  thinking.  What  is  the  'Western 
philosophical  tradition'  and  how  does  Derrida  oppose  the  thinking  process  of  this 
tradition?  It is useful to start discussing the general oppositions Western tradition has 
based  its  reasoning  upon.   Culler  (1997)  summarizes  these  as  follows:  “...Western 
philosophy  has  distinguished  'reality'  from  'appearance',  things themselves  from 
representations of them, and  thought from  signs  that express it” (Culler,  1997, p.9). 
Plato's  and  Aristotle's  approaches  illustrate  the  oppositions  between  reality  and 
appearance, things and representations, thought and signs.
Plato defines reality and appearance as opposites . “Well sure, I could make the 
appearances,  but  not  the reality  and the truth of  them” (Plato,  1998,  p.361).   Plato 
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(1998) starts discussing this by asking the meaning of 'portrayal'.  He uses the objects 
couch  and  table  as  examples  to  display  his  thought.  He  distinguishes  between 
couch/table and couchness/tableness. It  can be inferred from Plato that couchness or 
tableness is reality, whereas couch or table is appearance.  He distinguishes among the 
“couch in  nature” (couchness,  real  couch, the aspect  itself),  the couch made by the 
craftsman and the couch made by the painter.  According to Plato,  couchness is  the 
reality, the couch made by the craftsman is the appearance, and the one made by the 
painter  is  the  reproduction  of  the  appearance.   Thus,  the  appearances  that  artists 
reproduce  are  at  a  “third  remove  from nature”  (Plato,  p.  363).   Therefore,  artistic 
representation is  the portrayal  of an appearance or  an image rather  than being the 
portrayal of reality.  Plato defines reality as the aspect of something that makes it itself. 
He indicates that it is the couchness or tableness, not a couch or a table.  Through his 
'allegory of the cave', Plato (1998) states that the things we see in this world are actually 
illusions of  reality.  The shadows of the objects on the wall of the cave are perceived as 
real objects by the people living in the cave.  What we see around us are not the real 
things, they are only illusions.  While talking about the example of the couch, Plato says 
that  “there  are  different  ways it  appears,  but  it's  not  different  itself”.   “The way it 
appears”  is  how it  is  seen  by  the  viewer.   Thus,  the  visual  images  of  objects  are 
appearances, they are not reality. “Is a couch any different from itself if you look at it 
from the side or from the front or from any other angle?  That is, there's no difference in 
it, even though it appears different” (Plato, p.363).  Then, according to Plato, our visual 
sense is not reliable; truth cannot be acquired through sensory experience.  He indicates 
that  the  way  physical  characteristics  of  the  objects  appear  to  us  through  visual 
experience are subjective while the objective can only be reached through measurement, 
which  is  “a  function  of  the  reasoning  aspect  of  the  soul”  (Plato,  p.370).  This  is  a 
dualistic approach to the mind-body problem.  Body as the totality of sense organs is 
not a reliable source of knowledge and truth.   Thus, according to Plato, truth can only 
be  grasped  through  the  reasoning  aspect  of  the  mind.   The  body  and/or  sensory 
experiences are not reliable. It can be said that the mind is involved with reality whereas 
the body perceives and interacts with appearances. Thus, according to Plato, there may 
be different ways a couch as a visual image appears to our senses, but in reality the 
couch is not different.  The mind/body opposition corresponds to the  reality/appearance 
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opposition.
 As  well  as  Plato,  Aristotle  who  conceptualizes  mimesis  as  an  imitation  and 
representation of the original defines art as mirroring and representing reality: “In his 
Poetics, Aristotle follows Plato in defining all art as mimesis. His list of imitative arts 
includes such disparate forms as poetry, painting, theater, dance, music, sculpture, as 
well as epic and other kinds of narrative” (Puetz, 2002). The other opposition which is 
fundamental  to  our  discussion  in  this  thesis  is  that  between  reality  and  language. 
Aristotle defines language as a medium of imitation. Signs are defined by their function 
of representing reality in Western traditional thinking.  Thought, truth and reality are 
represented by signs. 
 Signs or representations, in this view, are but a way to get at reality, truth, 
or  ideas, and they should be as transparent as possible; they should not get 
in the way, should not affect or infect the thought or truth they represent. 
(Culler,  p.9).  
Aristotle's  remarks  on  imitation  in  poetry  emphasize  the  transparency  issue  Culler 
mentions. Heath (1996) summarizes Aristotle's ideas as follows: “Poetry is imitation; it 
seeks to create likenesses, and the likeness is greater if the words involved in the action 
are presented directly rather than being mediated by a narrator” (Heath, 1996, p.xii ). 
The language and reality opposition can be clearly seen in Aristotle's conception of 
'mimesis', which is an imitation of an object on the basis of likeness.  The definition of 
the concept mimesis by Aristotle shows that there are objects and  imitations of them. 
Aristotle defines imitation as a natural possession giving us pleasure. Aristotle asserts 
that  imitation is pleasurable, because understanding is pleasant. Heath (1996) explains 
the relation between imitation and understanding as follows : “A likeness is likeness of 
something; to take part in the activity of making and responding to likenesses we must 
recognize the relationship between the likeness and its object” (Heath, p.xiii).  In other 
words, there should be some familiarity with the object to understand and take pleasure 
from its imitation.  While referring to painting, Aristotle indicates that the visual images 
in the painting are  imitations of objects. It can be inferred from this that there are real 
objects in the world and representations of these objects.  In painting, the medium of 
imitation is color and shape, whereas in other arts the “medium of imitation is rhythm, 
language  and melody” (Aristotle,  1996 p.3).   Language is  defined  as  a  medium of 
imitation, so reality is imitated and represented through language.  Here too, the strict 
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distinction between reality and language can be seen.  After the general overview of 
reality/appearance, things/representations and thought/sign oppositions, I would like to 
talk about poststructuralists' approach to these oppositions. 
First, Derrida asserts that all the oppositions which form the basis of our reasoning 
process  should  be  deconstructed.  These  binary  oppositions  belong  to  metaphysical 
thought.  According  to  Derrida  (1978),  metaphysical  thinking  depends  on  the 
assumption of “a foundation, a first principle, an essence” which grounds thinking. The 
assumption  that  there  is  a  truth,  and  an  essence  that  grounds  knowledge  and 
representation is the “metaphysics of presence”.  Any system of thought that is based on 
the existence of a center pointing to a fixed origin is metaphysical. “If this is so, the 
entire history of the concept of structure, before the rupture which we are speaking, 
must be thought of as a series of substitutions of center for center...” (Derrida, 1978 
p.279). Then, Western metaphysics is the history of a “series of substitutions of center 
for center”.  The center which is assumed to be existing takes on different names in 
Western  philosophy  up  to  Derrida.  However,  when  we  think  of  displacements  and 
substitutions in the signification system, we see that “a central presence...has always 
already been exiled from itself into its own substitute” (Derrida, p.280).  The absence of 
the center makes the endless play of signification possible.   There is  no center and 
origin that 'grounds the play of substitutions'.  The sign replaces the center, which is 
absent and which must be supplemented. Derrida indicates that “the sign which replaces 
the center in the absence of center” is a supplement. Thus, there is an excess, a surplus 
on the part of signifiers compared to signifieds.  Derrida asserts that the movement of 
signification  supplements  a  lack  on  the  part  of  the  signified:  “The  movement  of 
signification adds  something,  which results  in  the fact  that  there  is  always more...” 
(Derrida,  p.289).  “The  substitute  does  not  substitute  itself  for  anything  which  has 
somehow existed before it” (Derrida, p.280).   Then, the substitute is not the substitute 
of an origin or a center.  This is very important, because it means that  there is no hidden 
truth or origin behind substitutions and meaning is always being produced through the 
movement  of  substitutions.  For  instance,  Derrida indicates  that  Therese -Rousseau's 
lover- about whom Rousseau in his Confessions  write about cannot be thought as the 
substitute of Rousseau's mother since the love towards the mother is also a supplement 
rather  than  being  an  origin  and/or  natural  love:  “Therese  herself  be  already  a 
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supplement.  As Mamma was already the supplement of an unknown mother, and as the 
“true mother” herself...was also in a certain way supplement” (Derrida, 1998 ,p.156). 
The psychoanalytic view would interpret Therese as the substitute for the real mother. 
Thus, according to this view, there is a real mother, independent of substitutions, and 
her lack is supplemented through the substitution of Therese.   Derrida reverses this 
causal relationship and he indicates that there is not any original, real mother that is 
substituted by Therese, but the play of substitutions in language in the absence of a 
center produces the sense of  the real mother. To put it simply, it can be said that the 
existence of the mother is dependent on the play of substitutions, it is not that there is a 
real mother  independent of substitutions or system of differences. There is not any 
transcendental real that exceeds the text; the excess itself is created through the endless 
substitutions. 
Derrida underlines the binary oppositions behind Rousseau's reasoning. The first 
opposition is that of presence and absence.  Derrida indicates that  Rousseau equates 
speech and voice with presence while equating writing with absence and death.  This 
equation leads him to define writing as something that is added to speech: “...speech 
being natural  or at least the natural expression of thought...writing is added to it,  is 
adjoined, as an image or representation” (Derrida, 1998, p.144).  Derrida indicates that 
Western philosophical tradition has always valued speech over writing; because speech 
comes directly from the body of the speaker, it is immediate and vivid.  Thus, speech is 
thought to be the authentic and unmediated way of communication.  Derrida opposes 
this understanding by asserting that writing is prior to speech. The reason for assuming 
the priority of speech is the assumed connection between presence and speech. Derrida 
says that the assumed naturality of presence is self-sufficient according to Rousseau. 
Thus, there is no need for it  to be supplemented, because substitution will  never be 
equal to the real; presence is the essence and it cannot be replaced.  Writing means 
absence while speech is to be present.  He points out how "voice becomes a metaphor of 
truth and authenticity,  and a  source of  self-presence" (Sarup,  1996,  p.65).   Speech, 
however,  does not denote presence,  because presence and absence are possible only 
through the system of differences. Thus, we cannot talk about any presence which is 
independent of language. It exists as the outcome of the system of differences. Yet since 
meaning is deferred endlessly, presence can never be present or  it is present as well as 
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absent.  Sarup (1996) states that from Nietzsche to Derrida, the human subject is being 
abandoned and that there is a shift from the subject to the text.  Everything is language. 
Meaning is not there as an origin, and a ground, it is created through the system of 
differences.  Plato says that “there are different ways it appears, but it's  not different 
itself” while talking about the couches that craftsmen make.  However, according to 
Derrida, it is the difference that makes it a couch.  The  “difference” and “deferral” 
within  the  “movement  of  supplementarity”  makes  meaning  impossible.   However, 
meaning itself is created through the “endless play of significations”, thus meaning, as 
well as being impossible, is made possible through the signification system. “Something 
promises  itself  as  it  escapes,  gives  itself  as  it  moves away,  and strictly  speaking it 
cannot  even be called presence...The supplement  is  maddening because it  is  neither 
presence nor absence...” (Derrida, 1998, p. 155).  Derrida criticizes Saussure by saying 
that there is not a stable and predictable relationship between a signifier and a signified. 
Signifier  becomes   signified  and  signified  signifies  another  signifier  and  this  goes 
forever.   Thus,  meaning  travels  along  the  signification  chain,  “the  chain  of 
supplements”. It is not that there is a thing, a real referent in the outside world and a 
signifier  signifies  that  real  thing.  Things  are  created/constructed,  and 
recreated/reconstructed  everytime.   Derrida  puts  forward   the  concept  “differance” 
which  makes  meaning  impossible,  because  there  is  always  going  to  be  an  excess. 
According to him, play disrupts presence, because there is always an excess when you 
think of play of significations, there is something that escapes “the structurality of the 
sign”. The possibility of presence and absence through language is significant to argue 
against the assumption that writing simply represents what was present in itself:  “...the 
signifier 'dog' indicates the idea 'dog', but the real dog, the referent, is not present.  In 
Derrida's  view  the  sign  marks  an  absent  presence”  (Sarup,  p.69).   The  present  is 
impossible.  Because of the excess, meaning will always be deferred.  Yet, meaning is 
produced through deferral and difference, thus it is there.  The coexistence of presence 
and absence deconstructs the presence/absence opposition. Also, we cannot talk about 
any presence and absence outside of the text.  This is why the real dog, the referent is 
not present, because the signifier dog, by differing from other signifiers, slides along the 
signification system as a supplement.  The signifier dog neither represents 'real dog' nor 
complements it.  The signifier is within the text and since there is nothing outside of the 
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text,  there  is  nothing that  can be called as the 'real  dog'.   Here too,  the opposition 
reality/language -in terms of reality being the real and language being the representation 
of the real- gets deconstructed.  The 'real dog' is actually nothing other than the 'signifier 
dog'.  We are in the reality of the text. Language creates the dog. Thus, language is 
performative.  
Austin  defines  performative  utterances  as  utterances  which  perform  and  do 
something and which are not to be evaluated on the basis of  truth or descriptive value. 
He gives the statement 'I do' in wedding ceremonies as an example to the performative 
utterance.  By saying 'I do' in a wedding ceremony, the person becomes married.  Thus, 
the statement 'I do' does something.  However, the difficulty of trying to draw a strict 
boundary between performative and constative utterances causes Austin to leave this 
dichotomy aside.  Miller (2001) indicates that the most important discovery of Austin in 
How  to  Do  Things  with  Words  was  the  abandonment  of  this  dichotomy  and  the 
awareness that the two categories are  actually contaminated.   In other words,  every 
constative claim is performative and every performative claim is constative to some 
extent.  To summarize; more than doing things with words, words do things. In other 
words, language does not represent reality but it constructs reality.  It performs an act. 
Deleuze  is  another  poststructuralist  philosopher  who  questions  the  concept 
representation in relation to the constructive aspect of language.  Deleuze (1994) says 
that movement is repetition which generates itself through the disguises. In other words, 
repetition constitutes itself by moving from one mask to the other.  This movement 
includes the differences since repetition is actually the repetition of differences. When a 
work produces movement  within itself,  it  produces something new.  When it  is  the 
repetition of differences, nothing can represent the other.  New connections form and 
then break away in the continuous movement and flow of energies. Repetition takes the 
place of representation.  Nothing represents the other, everything does something. By 
way of illustration, Deleuze, cites Nietzsche, whom he sees as one of those philosophers 
who found new ways of doing philosophy. The production of action and movement lies 
at the center of this new philosophy.
They want to put metaphysics in motion, in action.  They want to make it act, 
and make it carry out immediate acts.  It is not enough, therefore, for them to 
propose  a  new  representation  of  movement;  representation  is  already   
mediation.  Rather, it is a question of producing within the work a movement 
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capable of affecting the mind outside of all representation... it is a question of 
making  movement  itself  a  work...They  invent  an  incredible  equivalent  of  
theatre within philosophy...(Deleuze, 1994, p.8)
Philosophy becomes the production of movement and action.  No element of reflection 
or representation takes part  in it.    Then it  could be concluded that movement as a 
repetition is staged in Nietzsche's philosophy. It is not represented, but it emerges as it is 
being  acted  out.  According  to  Deleuze,  philosophy  is  an  act  of  creation  and 
construction, and what it creates and constructs are the concepts. However, it is not to 
say that there is an idea that is represented via dramatization.  It is to say that a concept 
is  constructed  and  created  through  staging  and  movement.  “It  [repetition]  is  not 
underneath  the masks,  but  is  formed from one  mask to  another...”  (Deleuze,  p.17). 
Deleuze  (1994)  defines  Nietzsche's  Thus  Spoke  Zarathustra as  “theatre  within 
philosophy” because everything in the text is put into action and is visualized, thus it 
can be thought of as a text for the stage as well as philosophy.   
Remember the song of Ariadne from the mouth of the old Sorcerer: here, two  
masks are superimposed- that of a young woman, almost of a Kor which  has  
just been laid over the mask of a repugnant old man.  The actor must play the 
role of an old man playing the role of the Kore.  Here too, for Nietzsche, it  
is a matter of filling the inner emptiness of the mask within a theatrical space:  
by  multiplying  the  superimposed  masks   and  inscribing  the  
omnipresence of Dionysus in that  superimposition... When  Nietzsche says  
that the Overman resembles  Borgia rather tha Parsifal, or when  he  
suggests that the Overman belongs at once to both the Jesuit Order and the 
Prussian officer corps, we can understand these texts only by taking them 
for what they are: the remarks of a director indicating how the Overman  
should be 'played'”  (Deleuze, p.9)
The movement from one mask to the other, from the mask of Ariadne to the mask of the 
sorcerer gives birth to new connections.  Deleuze says that a work should produce, or 
rather be this movement.   Deleuze indicates that the superimposition of two masks, 
masks of a young woman and of an old man and the multiplication of masks with the 
presence of Dionysus in that imposition appears via the movement from one mask to the 
other. Repetition constitutes itself by moving from one mask to another, from one point 
to the other and this movement includes the differences.  Everything is in a state of 
becoming, and in a state of flux, nothing is 'is'.  That is to say, the text does not describe, 
explain and represent how to be the Overman, but it acts it out.  
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Description and explanation of a text is related to finding a coherent meaning in 
the text.  Deleuze indicates that  meaning is an interpretation which closes the zones of 
indetermination. The zones of indetermination, and the zones of indiscernibility appear 
only when all the possibilities exist together.  Deleuze indicates that what cannot be 
codified  and  what  escapes  meaning  can  only  be  found  through  the  zones  of 
indetermination, and the zones of indiscernibility. He opposes interpretation, because it 
is to say  'this means that, but not the other'.  His logic is not exclusive, it is inclusive; 
one possibility does not exclude the other.  This is why it cannot be said  'this means 
that, but not this other'; it could be both this and the other and none of them, all at the 
same time (Bogue, 1989).   Protevi (1999) makes a distinction between exclusive and 
inclusive disjunction.  The traditional oppositional logic is exclusive operating through 
'either-or' while the schizo logic is inclusive operating through 'either...or...or..or'.  Thus 
the schizo logic includes “system of possible permutations and differences that amount 
to the same as they shift and slide about” (Protevi, 1999, p.2).  The disjunctive synthesis 
is the togetherness of the possibilities that does not seem to match; either x or y or z or... 
Deleuze says that schizo-logic is inclusive by being open to all the possibilities and 
connections by  "either..or...or...or..." while classical logic excludes all the possibilities 
and/or reduces them into two by "either...or". Thus, the reason why Deleuze opposes 
interpretation is that it is a process of exclusion.  Only one possibility among the many 
is chosen and the text is not permitted to multiply, because that one possibility excludes 
and effaces the others.  Thus is the aim should be not to find representations, symbols, 
analogies, metaphors that signify some definite meaning. On the contrary, his aim is to 
make meaning indefinite and to find out how each time new connections form and then 
break down.   
It will be useful at this point to review Deleuze's distinct way of reading Freud's 
case study "wolf-man", because his objection aganist the psychoanalytic method reveals 
his ideas on how to multiply the text.   My aim here is not to criticize psychoanalytic 
theory through using Deleuze's theory.  However Deleuze's way of reading Freud's case 
analysis  is  important to notice how he subverts  the representational  value of a  text. 
Psychoanalytic  method  is  concerned  with  substitutions  and  metaphors.  In 
psychoanalysis, the wolf, horse or any other symbol is perceived as a substitute that 
masks a threatening reality. Dream analysis is the most apparent indicator of the search 
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for  metaphors  and  substitutions.  The  threat  of  a  conflict  prevents  any  direct 
signification, so there are displacement and condensation in dreams. The psychoanalytic 
view  deals  with  the  psychic  reality  which  is  concealed  behind  different  masks. 
Psychoanalytic view tries to reveal the hidden meaning and logic behind the symbols. 
Freud (1899/2004) makes a distinction between manifest and latent dream content. As 
the name implies, the manifest dream content is the apparent meaning of dreams.  In 
other words, it is the actual story as it is seen by the dreamer.  The latent dream content 
is the hidden meaning which reveals itself only after the analysis of the dreams.  Freud 
(1899/2004) talks about the tools of representation in dreams. These are condensation, 
displacement,  representation  and  symbols. In  his  case  study  of  the  “wolf-man”,  he 
indicates that the wolf in the dream symbolizes  “wolf-man's” father and he explains the 
“wolf-man's” anxiety with reference to the castration anxiety and the oedipal complex 
(Freud,  1914/1998).  Thus,  according  to  the  psychoanalytic  view,  behind  the  rich 
imagery of the dream there is one, major problem which is the fixation in the oedipal 
stage.   Deleuze (1980/1988) opposes Freud by saying that he reduces multiplicities to 
one; to the father, oedipal complex, or castration anxiety. The enriching visuality of the 
dream is being reduced to the father-child relationship. Deleuze (1980/1988) asserts that 
the wolf-multiplicity cannot be reduced to the oedipal complex. On the contrary, it is a 
state of becoming; of  becoming wolf. According to Deleuze, the wolf is not a metaphor 
hiding some reality that is behind it. He asserts that masks do not hide anything, but 
other masks.   Deleuze does not read Freud's “wolf- man” to find out what the wolf 
symbolizes, represents or signifies.  He does not take the wolf as a metaphor and does 
not try to find out any hidden reality behind the dream.  Deleuze (1988) says that things 
are not metaphors or representations, but everything remains within itself. There are 
beings in themselves. He indicates that the wolf should not be taken as symbolizing the 
father, but the text should be read without effacing the state of becoming.  "Becoming-
wolf" is a multiplicity that should not be reduced to one definite meaning (Deleuze, 
1988, p.28).  The zone of becoming-wolf is the zone of indetermination and it gives 
birth to new possibilities.  Thus, the wolf does not mean anything, it is a multiplication. 
Deleuze thinks that Freud's “wolf-man” should be read  in terms of “becoming-wolf”, 
becoming inhuman; the deterritorialization of the human through “becoming wolf” and 
of  the  wolf  through  becoming  human.   “Lines  of  flight  or  of  deterritorialization, 
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becoming-wolf,  becoming-inhuman,  deterritorialized  intensities:  that  is  what 
multiplicity  is.   To  become  wolf  or  to  become  hole  is  to  deterritorialize  oneself 
following distinct but entangled lines” (Deleuze, p.32).  For instance, a wasp becomes 
deterritorialized  when  it  is  on  an  orchid  because  it  becomes  part  of  the  flower's 
reproductive system. But at the same time, it reterritorializes the orchid, which was also 
deterritorialized by the wasp when the wasp became part of it, by carrying its pollen. 
Again, the orchid reterritorializes the wasp by making it carry its own pollen, because 
the wasp feeds on pollen. There is a continous deterritorialization and reterritorialization 
among things.  Just as we cannot talk about a wasp and an orchid as separate beings, we 
should not think of the wolf and the human being as two separate entities, -one of them 
representing  the  other.  There  is  no  origin,  no  first  term  that  is  to  be  substituted, 
displaced, and disguised.  Repetition repeats difference.  There is no representation and 
mimesis of the original: “There is only repetition that constitutes itself by disguising 
itself”(Deleuze, p.17).  So, there is repetition repeating difference, there is no first thing 
that can be isolated and repeated. In other words, the father in Freud's case study is not 
an origin or a first term which is represented by the wolf. According to Deleuze, the 
wolf-multiplicity cannot be reduced to the father, it is state of becoming.   
Deleuze also refers to Freud's case study of Dora by indicating that Freud explains 
the disguised repetition from Dora's father to Herr. K.  by means of the notions of id, 
ego and superego.   Thus, according to Freud, this “disguised repetition” is the result of 
some first, basic oppositions.  Deleuze opposes Freud's theory by saying that “there is 
no first term which is to be repeated”.  According to Freud, K. in Dora's case is the 
father substitute, and therefore Dora imagines K. seducing her.  In this kind of analysis, 
the  young  girl's  love  towards  her  father  is  perceived  as  existing  independently of 
repetition. However, according to Deleuze, there is nothing independent of repetition 
and  no  first  thing  to  be  repeated. Using  the  word  'cause'  may  be  wrong,  because 
repetition and difference are not origin according to Deleuze, however for the purpose 
of explanation, it could be said that repetition is the cause of Dora's love for her father. 
In other words, only through repetition, Dora's love for the father appears. Thus, Dora's 
love for the father is not an origin or first term, but it is a repetition and can only be 
understood  in  “relation  to  masks”.  Thus  the   repetition  makes  things  appear.   For 
instance, the child's love for the mother is not to be repeated and substituted by  love for 
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another woman. On the contrary, repetition gives birth to the love of the mother: 
even our childhood love for the mother repeats other adult loves with regard  
to  other  women...There  is  therefore  nothing  repeated  which  may  be  
isolated or abstracted from the repetition...There  is  no  bare  repetition  
which may be abstracted or inferred from the disguise itself” (Deleuze, 1994,  
p.17) 
The  distinction  between  psychoanalytic  perspective  and  Deleuze's  theory  is  not 
discussed to value one over the other, however Deleuze's reading of a text, wolf-man or 
Dora,  suggests  a  completely  new  way  of  reading  which  prevents  the  reader  from 
searching  for  metaphors,  symbols  and  analogies  that  represents  any  hidden  reality. 
Thus,  Deleuze's  perspective enables  the reader  to  explore the text  as a  construction 
which creates new ways of thinking instead of sticking to any pre-determined meaning. 
Deleuze puts forward the importance of the coexistence of distinct possibilities aganist 
the descriptions, explanations and definite meanings. Thus, instead of searching for a 
definite meaning, Beckett's texts will be analyzed on the basis of its formal qualities 
through the new way Deleuze opens in terms of reading a text.   
Despite  many  important  distinctions  between  Derrida  and  Deleuze,  they  both 
argue against the idea of 'representation', they both deconstruct reality and appearance, 
thing  and representation,   thought  and  sign  oppositions.   Most  importantly  for  our 
discussion here,  they attribute  to  language both a  constructive  and a  deconstructive 
force.  They do not theorize language only as representing reality. For both of them 
every work of art or literature does something, rather than being the representation of 
reality.  Derrida and Deleuze differ in their ideas of how to read and write, but in terms 
of  not  looking for metaphors,  substitutions,  and representations,  they resemble each 
other.  However, they both put forward distinct and interesting ideas about how to read 
and write  a  text.   If  we return to  the  discussion of  what  it  means for  a  text  to  do 
something, there is one very clear distinction between how Plato, and Aristotle on the 
one hand, and Derrida and, Deleuze on the other hand -without forgetting the fact that 
the pairs also differ among themselves- conceive any work of art and literature.  This 
distinction can be explained through the concept 'representation'.   Plato and Aristotle 
protect the strict boundary between fiction and reality whereas the boundary is effaced 
or blurred in Derrida and Deleuze. To generalize and simplify, the distinction between 
these two ways of thinking can be summarized as the difference between influence and 
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construction.  A work of  art  or  literature  influences  the viewer,  performer,  writer  or 
reader in terms of their ideas and feelings in Plato and Aristotle whereas they construct 
and form what is called 'reality' in Derrida and Deleuze.  Thus, both for Derrida and 
Deleuze there is no reality that can be represented. However, there is one thing that I 
would like to emphasize strongly: Derrida and Deleuze are used as pairs not to equalize 
them. These two theorists are quite different from each other.  However, even though 
through distinct ways, they both oppose the representative, mimetic nature of language 
and they free themselves from the traditional ways of thinking and doing philosophy. 
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Chapter 3
CORPOREALITY OF LANGUAGE AND LANGUAGE OF CORPOREALITY
SCHIZOPHRENIA AS A CORPOREAL LANGUAGE
 
Deleuze says that other than being a philosophical text  Thus Spoke Zarathustra 
can also be thought of as a work for the stage.  It is actually the “equivalent of theatre 
within philosophy”.  According to Deleuze (1994), Thus Spoke Zarathustra can only be 
understood if it is perceived as  the notes of a director on how the character Overman 
should be played.  It should be understood to the extent that we as readers should be 
hearing the “cries of the higher man”. The text does not describe, explain and represent 
how to be the Overman, but acts it out. In other words, the text acts itself, it is “put into 
motion”  (Deleuze,  p.8)  The  Overman  is  made  visible  and  audible  through  the 
corporeality of language or rather through the language that is made corporeal in the 
text.  A text is put into action or it acts itself out only if it resists being evaluated within 
the  constraints  of  meaning  and  representation.  Similar  to  what  Deleuze  says  for 
Nietzsche's  text,  schizophrenic  language  by  resisting  to  meaning  and  representation 
transforms  language  into  a  gesture  through  making  language  act  itself  out. 
Schizophrenic language resists being attributed a definite meaning as well as resisting 
any  kind  of  interpretation  by  continuously  deconstructing  itself.   Schizophrenic 
language effaces the boundary between the body and language by making corporeal and 
incorporeal  elements  function  together.   The  relationship  among  signifiers  in 
schizophrenic speech is not constituted on the basis of meaning but rather on the basis 
of  the  materiality  of  words.   By  being  devoid  of  meaning,  schizophrenic  language 
deterritorializes the social norms, laws and rules of major language. Thus, schizophrenic 
language may be defined as a “foreign language”.  Deleuze (1988) talks about placing 
linguistic, incorporeal and non-linguistic, corporeal elements in variation while creating 
a “foreign language”. Putting incorporeal and corporeal elements in variation means to 
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make them “function together”. In other words, it is to make corporeal and incorporeal 
elements interact each other. Gestures, speeds, and intervals are some examples of non-
linguistic elements. There can be gestures, cries, and silences in a text, but according to 
Deleuze, writing means to transform a text into a gesture, cry and silence. It can be 
concluded,  inspired  from  Deleuze,  that  the  text  becomes  a  constructed  or  a  self-
constructing body. However, this is different from claiming that language constructs the 
body or that everything is language. On the contrary, the text can be made to act to the 
extent that language becomes a gesture, cry or silence. According to Deleuze, when a 
text is put into action, it does not represent these non-linguistic, corporeal elements but 
transforms itself into them or becomes them.  I think when language is made to act 
instead  of  mean,  the  distinction  between  the  body  and  language  gets  effaced. 
Schizophrenia is a good example to illustrate what is meant by  the effacement of the 
boundary  between  the  body  and  language,  because  it  is the  inability  to  coordinate 
between  materiality  and  signification.  Materialization  of  the  fragmented  body  and 
subject through the physicality of language is where the distinction between the body 
and  language  gets  lost.   What  does  it  mean  to  make  language  corporeal?  How is 
language made to act?  
Deleuze makes a distinction between making language stammer and stammering 
in  speech:  “It's  easy to  stammer,  but  making language itself  stammer is  a  different 
affair; it involves placing all linguistic, and even non-linguistic, elements in variation, 
both variables of expression and variables of content” (Deleuze, 1988, p.98). As it was 
mentioned in the preceeding paragraph,  putting non-linguistic and linguistic elements 
in variation is to put these elements into interaction.  Deleuze gives the example of knife 
cutting the flesh to the corporeal transformations: “When knife cuts flesh, when food or 
poison spreads through the body, when a drop of wine falls into the water, there is an 
intermingling of  bodies” (Deleuze,  p.  86).  The  connection between knife  and flesh, 
food/poison and internal organs, wine and water is the corporeal transformation. On the 
other hand, there are incorporeal transformations. The statement “knife is cutting the 
flesh” can be given as an example to incorporeal transformations. The statement “knife 
is cutting the flesh” does not represent or signify the corporeal elements. Thus, there is 
not any signifier-signified relation between corporeal and incorporeal elements. Deleuze 
states that there is a continous interaction between them.  For instance, the juridical 
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decision does not represent or signify the defendant's guilt. The judgement given in the 
form of a death sentence does not represent the guilt of the defendant.   Let's suppose 
that the crime of the defendant was to shoot someone in the head.  Here the connection 
between the hand machine,  gun machine and head machine can be thought  of  as a 
corporeal transformation. Or suppose that the defendant is condemned to death and that 
he will be hanged.  When the rope actually squeezes his neck, the connection between 
the rope machine and the neck machine is built. Because this connection is bodily, it is a 
corporeal transformation. However, the statement of the jury as “he is condemned to 
death” is an example to incorporeal and non-linguistic elements.  If there is not any 
representational relation between incorporeal and corporeal elements, then what does it 
mean to place them in variation?  Putting these elements in variation means to provide 
an interaction between gesture, speed, interval and linguistic elements. In other words, it 
is  to  make  corporeal  and  incorporeal  elements  function  together  to  the  extent  that 
language  becomes  the  “cries  of  the  higher  man”,  “silence”,  “music”,  and  “painful 
waiting”. According to Deleuze, linguistic and non-linguistic elements should be placed 
in variation to make language stammer.  Making language stammer means “to draw 
from  it  [language]  cries,  shouts,  pitches,  durations,  timbres,  accents,  intensities” 
(Deleuze,  p.104).   Foreign  language  by  making corporeal  and  incorporeal  elements 
function  together  transforms  language  into  “cries  of  the  higher  man”,  “silence”, 
“music”, and “painful waiting”. 
Deleuze  says  that  writing  means  pushing  the  language,  the  syntax,  all  the  
way to a  particular  limit,  a  limit  that  can  be  a  language  of  silence,  or  a  
language of music,  or  a  language  that's  for  example,  a  painful  waiting. 
(Stivale, 2003)
The relationship among signifiers in schizophrenic language is not constituted on 
the basis of meaning but rather on the basis of the materiality of words. Schizophrenic 
language  resists being evaluated within the constrains of meaning and representation, 
thus  schizophrenic  language  makes  it  impossible  to find  representations,  symbols, 
analogies,  metaphors  that  signify  some meaning. By making language physical  and 
material,  schizophrenic  language  puts  a  text  into  action.  How  can  we  define 
schizophrenic language and how does schizophrenic language make language material 
and physical? 
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Before explaining schizophrenia as a psychotic disorder in detail, I would like to 
clarify  that I do not propose schizophrenia as a positive or a negative state of being. 
The  way  schizophrenic  people  experience  the  world  is  usually  expressed  as  very 
painful, thus I do not propose schizophrenia as a sublime state of being as well as not 
labeling  this  kind  of  an  existence  as  negative  or  abnormal.   I  just  approach 
schizophrenic language as a different and distinct way of language use and evaluate 
schizophrenic language as it is without making any interpretation on the difficulty of the 
emotional state of being schizophrenic. As a psychotic disorder, schizophrenia is the 
fragmentation  of  the  body and the  subject  in  relation  to  the  loss  of  the  distinction 
between the self and the other, the inside and the outside, the subject and the object. 
The absence of the sense of an unified self determines the distinct way of language use 
in schizophrenic people.   Schizophrenia, which is the absence of a stable identity, is a 
continuous 'becoming'.  Like the wolf-multiplicity that Deleuze explains by criticizing 
Freud's  approach,  schizophrenia  is  a  multiplication of  identities  in  the absence of  a 
stable ego and unified self.   The  relationship between the formation of the ego and 
language acquisition is  significant to understand the relation between schizophrenic 
language and the fragmented self.  Jameson's approach to schizophrenia is very different 
from Deleuze's, but the part in which he explains language use by schizophrenic people 
sheds  light  on  Deleuze's  idea  of  placing  linguistic  and  non-linguistic  elements  in 
variation.   Jameson follows Lacan's conceptualization of  schizophrenia as a language 
disorder. According to Lacan, the mirror stage is a pre-linguistic stage where there is a 
complete unification with the mother and where the child does not have any identity 
independent of the mother; s/he is the desire of  the mother.  The child can have his/her 
own desire only after s/he is subjected to the rules of language in the symbolic order. 
When  s/he  is  separated  from the  mother  by  the  name  of  the  father,   the  child  is 
transformed from being the desire of the mother to an individual who desires the mother 
(Tura, 1996).   In other words, the child can have his/her own desire only after s/he 
enters  the  symbolic  stage  in  which  language  acquisition  occurs.  Only  after  the 
separation, the mother becomes a lack for the child. Schizophrenic individuals lack the 
necessary  lack  to  have  a  separate  identity,  because  they  do  not  complete  the 
oedipalization process and enter the symbolic order.  The necessary identification with 
the law of the father through whom the norms and rules of the society is recognized is 
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absent  in  schizophrenic  individuals.   This  absence  prevents  the  formation  of  the 
superego  and  ego.    According  to  Lacan,  the  fixation  in  the  mirror  stage  and  the 
rejection of the symbolic order due to the absence of the name of the father are the 
reasons that lie beneath schizophrenia. Wrobel also attracts attention to the problematic 
relationship between schizophrenic individuals and their fathers: “Conversations with 
schizophrenic subjects have shown that the word 'father' is used and understood by them 
in a very special way” (Wrobel, 1990, p.41).  In the mirror stage, the child hits another 
child, but s/he indicates that it was the other who hit him/her: “He says Francois hit me, 
whereas it was him who hit Francois” (Welton, 1999, p. 213). An individual who does 
not have a sense of self cannot have a sense of the other.  In schizophrenia, the results of 
the absence of any distinction between subject/object, inside/outside, self/other and the 
breakdown  of  time-space  unity  are  depersonalization,  derealization  and 
detemporalization.  The  communication  conventions  "I-here-now"  of  the  'normal' 
subject do not exist in schizophrenic language: 'I' becomes equal to 'he/she/other', 'here' 
to  'there/somewhere'  and  'now'  to  'before/after'  (Wrobel,  1990).  Thus,  as  Wrobel 
emphasizes, schizophrenics do not care to whom they are talking to, and about what and 
how they are talking. Wrobel states that for a speech or a text to communicate any 
meaning, there should be a sender, receiver, topic, purpose and style. When there is no 
difference between the sender and receiver, in other words, when I is equal to you and 
s/he, we cannot talk about any topic, purpose or style of  communication.  
 Lacan indicates that  "meaning emerges only through discourse...displacements 
along  a  signifying  chain"   (Sarup,  p.  23).  Thus,  as  Jameson  mentions  "what  we 
generally call the signified is...generated and projected by the relationship of signifiers 
among themselves" (Jameson, 1998, p. 26).  Then, the 'signified' is the  relation between 
signifiers.   In  schizophrenic  language  there  is  no  relationship  of  signifiers  among 
themselves and this is the breakdown in the signifying chain that Jameson mentions: 
"When that relationship breaks down, when the links of the signifying chain snap, then 
we have  schizophrenia  in  the form of  a  rubble  of  distinct  and unrelated  signifiers" 
(Jameson, p.26).   As Jameson indicates, there are pure material signifiers and signifiers 
in  isolation  in  schizophrenic  communication.   Because  signifiers  are  circulated 
continuously  without  any  relation among themselves  in  schizophrenic  language,  the 
meaning  that  would  have arisen  from this  relationship is  effaced.   Felman's  (2003) 
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interpretations about how madness takes place in discourse are parallel to Jameson's: 
"...as a passion for the signifier, as a repetititon of signs -without regard for what is 
signified" (Felman, p. 108). Thus, schizophrenic communication can be defined by the 
eclipse  of  signifieds  or  referents.  Felman  describes  the  madman's  discourse  as  the 
"functional possibility of permutation of signifiers". Distinct signifiers are combined on 
the basis of their sounds, rhythm and musicality, which arises from the materiality of 
words.  
Again, in normal speech, we try to see through the materiality of words (their 
strange  sounds  and  printed  appearance,  my  voice  timbre  and  peculiar  
accent,  and  so  forth)  towards  their  meaning.   As  meaning  is  lost,  the  
materiality of words becomes obsessive..." (Jameson, p. 138).   
The absence of the signifieds and the different possibilities of combination of signifiers 
on the basis of the materiality of words prevent schizophrenic language from signifying 
anything other than itself. Language stops being a tool of communication in the absence 
of  signifieds.   Language  refers  back  to  its  own  materiality  and  physicality. 
Communicating  a  coherent  meaning  is  not  the ultimate  goal  of  language  use  when 
signifiers  are  combined  on  the  basis  of  their  materiality.   The  sound,  rhythm  and 
musicality  of  the  words  determine  the  flow  of  the  sentences  in  schizophrenic 
communication instead of the motivation and goal of the speaker.  It is as if language is 
speaking without taking the speaker into consideration or as if the speaker finds out 
what  s/he  is  going to  say through the physicality  of  the  words.  The  examples  that 
Andreasen  (1979)  gives   are  crucial  to  quote  here  to  see  the  sentence  flow  in 
schizophrenic language:
question: Can we talk for a few minutes?
answer: Talk for a few minutes.
I'm not trying to make noise.  I am trying to make sense.  If you can't make  
sense out of nonsense, well, have fun.
I'll think I'll put on my hat, my hat, my hat, my hat, my hat, my hat...   (“Ask 
Dr-Robert”, 2008)
The poetic language with the repetitions and harmony of the sounds shows that the 
materiality of one sentence determines the second sentence.  Materiality of the signifiers 
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are  not  of  course  the  sole  determinant  of  the  way  a  sentence  is  formed,  but  the 
dominance of the material and physical aspects of the signifiers in the formation of a 
sentence can be observed much more clearly  in schizophrenic language than in normal 
communication.  
Jameson's statement that “in normal speech, we try to see through the materiality 
of words...towards their meaning.  As meaning is lost, the materiality of words become 
obsessive" makes a distinction between the materiality and meaning of the words. The 
distinction between relationship among signifiers based on the materiality of words and 
based on the meaning of words is actually artificial.   However, this distinction puts 
forward an important insight in terms of the constructive and performative aspects of 
language.  It could be claimed that schizophrenic language puts forward and/or stages 
what  the  poststructuralist  view  states  about  the  absence  of  signifieds.  As  the 
poststructuralists state, the signifieds are already absent regardless of schizophrenic or 
'normal' communication.  However, it  could be claimed that there is one difference; 
'normal' language gives the sense that there are signifieds which the signifiers signify 
whereas the schizophrenic language by preventing any direct relation between signifiers 
and what they signify, by making any definite meaning impossible, stages this absence 
as it is. It reveals the absence of signifieds through its unfamiliar signifier combinations 
and thus opens up a reality which can only be constructed by schizophrenic language by 
invalidating any definite meaning and representation differently from 'normal' language. 
As it was briefly mentioned at the beginning of the paper, according to Derrida, the only 
reality is the reality of language.  Jameson by making reference to Lacan also indicates 
that the formation of meaning is the result of the relationship among signifiers.  It is not 
really the complete absence of the meaning that distinguishes schizophrenic language 
from  normal  language.   If  meaning  is  generated  through  the  relationship  among 
signifiers, as long as there are signifiers, there will be some meaning. However, normal 
language does not allow the listener to notice this distinction, because it deals with the 
meaning  not  with  the  materiality  of  the  words.  Yet,  schizophrenic  language  puts 
forward the distinction between materiality and meaning. Schizophrenic communication 
is not distinguishable from the normal in terms of the loss of meaning but it differs from 
the  normal  in  terms  of  operating  through  this  distinction  as  well  as  revealing  the 
distinction.   Deleuze's  theory  on  making  corporeal,  non-linguistic  and  incorporeal, 
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linguistic elements function together can also be explained through this revelation since 
materiality is corporeal.   It  can be said that schizophrenic language makes language 
'stammer'  by  drawing “from it  [language]  cries,  shouts,  pitches,  durations,  timbres, 
accents,  intensities” (materiality)  to the extent that it  becomes a gesture.   The word 
'noise' in the first sentence of the third example above determines the word 'sense' in the 
second sentence.  The third sentence repeats the word 'sense' which generates the word 
'nonsense'.  Thus, as Andreasen (1979) points out, the sounds rather than the meanings 
of the words govern the sentence.  Yet, the sentence makes some sense; it is not a totally 
irrevelant statement.  The perceptibility of the materiality of the words together with the 
meaning that the words generate reveals the constructive power of language.  With the 
constructive aspect of language theorized and developed by poststructuralist thinkers, 
the presence of an unified, self-conscious individual who can express himself in a fully 
conscious  manner  through  using  language  gets  deconstructed.  According  to  the 
poststructuralist  view,  the  subject  is  constructed  by  the  language  s/he  uses.   The 
possibilities  that  the  materiality  of  signifiers  open  by  distinct  combinations  reveal 
themselves through schizophrenic language, because it is as if language finds its own 
way through its rhythm and musicality without much intervention of the subject. As the 
poststructuralist  thinkers  assert,  the  subject  is  being  constructed  as  s/he  is  using 
language.   Schizophrenic  language  reveals  this  construction  through  blurring  the 
distinction between materiality and meaning.  However, blurring this distinction is the 
only way to reveal the existence of the distinction, because in normal communication, 
meaning is  the only thing that is  searched for,  while  schizophrenic  language makes 
meaning and materiality coexist.  The repetitive use of the word 'hat' is a clear example 
to  the  coexistence  of  the  meaning  and  materiality  of  the  words  in  schizophrenic 
language.   The speaker  says  that  s/he  will  think  that  s/he  will  put  his  hat  on.  The 
grammatical incorrectness of the sentence makes it somewhat ambiguous, but it makes 
sense. Even if it is indefinite, the sentence has a meaning.  In terms of pure meaning, the 
repetitive use of the word 'hat' does not make any difference; however, the needless and 
excessive use of the word attracts the attention of the reader  to the materiality of the 
word 'hat'.  When the word 'hat' is used for the first time, the reader hears the meaning 
of the word, but as it gets repeated, the reader starts to read the materiality of the word. 
The form of the word replaces the content and the act of repetition takes the place of 
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what is repeated.  In other words, the act of repetition (materiality) exists together with 
the  meaning  of  the  word,  one  could  say,  borrowing  the  phrase  from  Deleuze,  by 
deterritorializing and reterritorializing each other.  Through the reciprocal relationship 
between meaning and materiality, the constructive power of language in the formation 
of meaning can be easily observed. Schizophrenic language transforms language into a 
material that one can play with by giving it many different forms as if playing with 
dough.  In other words, language becomes material and the material becomes language. 
The distinction between materiality  and meaning gets  effaced to the extent  that  the 
materiality and physicality of language and language of physicality and materiality are 
equalized. Saying that they are equalized is actually another way of claiming that the 
boundary between the body and language gets blurred.  As well as language involves 
the physicality of the body, the body involves the physicality of language.  In other 
words, as well as the body is a textual production, the text is a bodily production. It is 
impossible  to  distinguish  or  draw  a  strict  boundary  between  the  two.  By  saying 
language of physicality and materiality, I am talking about language of the body which 
makes language physical.  However, since the boundary between the body and language 
cannot be  strictly determined, we cannot talk about language of the body independently 
from language. One could see through schizophrenic language that sounds make up the 
meaning and meaning has sounds.  That is what makes language visible and audible. In 
other words, the physicality and materiality of language generates meaning as well as 
the materiality has a meaning.  
When  language is made to act, new concepts are created.  According to Deleuze, 
philosophy  is  an  act  of  creation  and  construction  of  new  concepts.  Schizophrenic 
language,  which makes  language act  by making language corporeal  and by making 
corporeality language creates new connections and concepts without staying within the 
limits of representation and meaning. Deleuze states that instead of asking the meaning 
of a work of literature, one should ask what it does (Bogue, 1989).  It could be claimed 
that schizophrenic language displays the fact that talking and writing are acts that create 
and construct new concepts.  Schizophrenic language effaces the distinction between 
doing  and  saying.   It  creates  its  own  ways  of  thinking  through  the  materiality  of 
language. Saying does something, saying performs an act by creating new connections 
and  ways  of  thinking.  By  making  materiality  and  meaning  'function  together', 
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schizophrenic language makes meaning indefinite and thus it prevents language from 
being perceived as  representing reality.   It  prevents us from thinking of reality  and 
language as distinct categories,  because schizophrenic language, through the distinct 
combination of signifiers, creates its own reality, which is not familiar to us. 
However,  schizophrenic  language  is  not  completely  unrelated  to  the  language 
'normal'  people  use.   The  same  signifiers  are  used  with  different  combinations  in 
schizophrenic language. Schizophrenic language through its connection to the normal 
makes  some  characteristics  of  normal  language  visible.   The  goal-directedness  of 
normal language as communicating our thoughts leads us to perceive language as if it 
were a tool that is being used to express ourselves, and to perceive ourselves as having 
an existence that is independent of language. Through the materiality which governs 
meaning, schizophrenic language makes us notice that signifieds are nothing other than 
relationships among signifiers and that distinct combination of signifiers will generate 
distinct, indefinite meanings. The structure of language, which could be said to hide 
itself behind meaning in normal communication, reveals itself through the grammatical 
incorrectness and the rhythmical pattern of the sentences in schizophrenic language.
To conclude, schizophrenic language effaces the distinction between materiality 
and meaning by making them function together.  Schizophrenic language transforms 
language into a “silence”, “music”, “painful waiting” by “drawing from it cries, shouts, 
pitches,  durations,  timbres,  accents,  intensities”.   However,  rather  than  saying  that 
language  becomes  corporeal,  one  should  assert  that  corporeality  and/or  materiality 
becomes  language  as  well  as  language  becomes  corporeal  and/or  material.. 
Schizophrenic language deconstructs the body and language distinction.  It is no longer 
possible  to  talk  about  the  body  independently  from  language  and  language 
independently from the body.
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Chapter 4  
BECKETT'S PLAYS
4.1  Introduction
Staging  a  Beckett  play  requires  a  director  to  adhere  to  every  little  detail  of 
Beckett's texts.  I  think Beckett displays the fact that to create a theatrical language 
independent of other forms of art, it is not necessary to be free of the intentions of the 
author  and the  text.  Beckett  removes the boundary between the body and language 
through the physicality and materiality of language. Beckett's language is physical and 
on  stage  he  transforms  every  bodily  movement  into  language.   By  effacing  the 
distinction between the body and language, Beckett creates a physicality which can be 
expressed  through language as  opposed to  Artaud who asserts  that to  make theatre 
independent  of other  forms of  art,  a  kind of  physicality which cannot  be expressed 
through  words,  should  be  created.  Artaud  dreams  of  a  non-representational  theatre 
which distinguishes itself from the other forms of art,  for instance literature. Artaud 
opposes  classical  theatre  which  is  representational  and  text-bound.   He  asserts  that 
instead of representing another language, theatre should find its own language. He puts 
forward  the  importance  of  pure  sensibility  and  visibility  through  physicality  of  the 
body:  “Theatricality  must  traverse  and  restore  existence  and  flesh  in  each  of  their 
aspects.  Thus, whatever can be said of the body can be said of the theatre” (Derrida, 
1978, p.232).  Beckett shows that we cannot talk about the body as a distinct category 
and that the physical existence of the body is not necessary for the physicality of the 
body.  Also, physicality of the body is not the only way to find the “speech before 
words”.  Beckett  shows that even if  there is  something as “speech before words” as 
Artaud claims, it can also be attained through language.
 Beckett's plays are analyzed as involving existentialist themes questioning the 
meaning of existence in relation to death extensively. Also, the theatre of the absurd 
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cannot  be  overlooked while  making a  contextual  and a  formal,  stylistic  analysis  of 
Beckett's plays.  However, working on Beckett through these perspectives is a recurring 
and thus in a way no longer qualified and exciting way of trying to understand his plays. 
Actually, the richness and complexity of the plays are being reduced to certain themes 
and this prevents the texts from opening the reader and audience their deeper layers. 
Thus,  instead  of  discussing  Beckett  from  these  widely  known  perspectives,  I  will 
analyze the formal qualities of his plays rather than the content and what the texts mean 
to get a sense of Beckett's means of creating his own distinct theatrical language.
I  do  not  categorize  Beckett's  language  as  schizophrenic  even  though  many 
similarities may be found.  I examined schizophrenic language as an example to discuss 
what it means to efface the boundary between the body and language.  Also, because 
schizophrenia  is  the  absence  of  the  distinction  between the  self  and  the  other,  -we 
cannot  talk  about  any unified subject  who uses language to  express  himself/herself. 
Materialization of the fragmented body and subject through the physicality of language 
is  where  the  distinction  between  the  body  and  language  gets  lost.  As  opposed  to 
classical theatre, there are no characters in Beckett's plays.  There is no unified subject 
whose self is organized around a certain goal, motivation and desire.  The subjects do 
not use language to express themselves or to communicate any coherent meaning.  The 
absence of  an unified character  makes  Beckett  distinct  in  terms of  language usage. 
While  analyzing  the  plays,  I  will  draw  attention  to  the  similarities  between 
schizophrenic  language  and  Beckett's  language,  but  I  will  avoid  using  the  term 
schizophrenic for Beckett's language, because that would set a limit to the analysis of 
the plays.
In this thesis, I analyze four Beckett plays which are Not I, Act Without Words II,  
What Where,  and Play.  Not I is an important play in terms of blurring the distinction 
between I and the other or inside and the outside.  The loss of boundaries between I and 
the other makes meaning indefinite.  In other words, it makes the coexistence of distinct 
possibilities  of  meaning  possible.   The  words  as  being  the  action  of  the  mouth  is 
significant to analyze to see how Beckett  blurs the boundary between the body and 
language.  Act Without Words II  stages the materiality and physicality of the body as 
generating meaning and/or materiality and physicality as meaning.  There is no dialogue 
in the play, thus the body is the only material that is used in creating meaning. The 
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stylized  and  unnatural  bodily  gestures  refer  to  the  performative  dimension  of 
movement.  What Where is analyzed in terms of constructive power of language or as 
how meaning is impossible as well as possible.  Lastly, Play is an important play to see 
how language involves the physicality of the body.
 Deleuze  defines  Nietzsche's  Thus  Spoke  Zarathustra as  “theatre  within 
philosophy”  because  everything  in  the  text  is  put  into  action  and  motion  and  is 
visualized. Thus, the text should be read “as the remarks of a director indicating how 
Overman should be played”.  Deleuze's argument on Nietzsche reveals and displays the 
basic  elements  of  theatre.  When  this  is  connected  to  Deleuze's  “Postulates  of 
Linguistics”  where  he  talks  about  placing  linguistic,  corporeal  elements  and  non-
linguistic,  incorporeal  elements  in  variation,  it  could be  concluded that  theatre  puts 
things into motion and action by making corporeal and incorporeal elements function 
together.  Based on Deleuze,  I  think what  replaces  representation and meaning with 
acting and doing or what makes us search for what a text does instead of what it means 
is  the theatre within  philosophy  or  literature.   How  does  Beckett's  texts  create  a 
theatrical  frame or  how does  Beckett  put  forward  theatre  as  a  frame?  It  could  be 
claimed that through making reference to its own construction or itself as a construction, 
Beckett  puts  forward theatre  as  a  frame.  Through the the  frame of  theatre,  Beckett 
discusses that language is constructive and performative while the plays construct and 
perform their own reality. Thus, in Beckett's plays, the only reality is the reality of the 
theatrical frame. Beckett's theatrical language will be analyzed as it performs and stages 
the  constructive  and  performative  aspects  of  language.  Yet,  first  of  all,  what  is  a 
theatrical frame?
Brooks indicates that “for a theater to take place, an actor walks across an empty 
space while someone else is watching” (Brooks, 1996).  According to Brooks, for us to 
call  something as theatre,  the conditions that should be met are the existence of an 
empty space, an actor and a viewer.  It can be inferred from Brooks that theater is about 
viewing and being viewed.  The use of the word 'actor' shows that the actor is aware of 
the fact that he is being viewed and that the viewer knows that s/he is watching an actor. 
The Greek root of the word 'theater' also displays the central importance of the viewing 
practice: “The Greek ancestor of theater is theātron, 'a place for seeing, especially for 
dramatic representation, theater'.  Theātron is derived from the verb theāsthai, 'to gaze 
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at, contemplate, view as spectators, especially in the theater', from  theā, 'a viewing'” 
(http://www.answers.com/topic/theater).  What  if  the  viewer  thinks  that  the  person 
walking across an empty space is an actor whereas s/he is actually a stage technician? 
Can we call this theatre?  The reverse is also valid.  The viewer can think that the play 
has  not  begun  yet  and  that  the  person  walking  across  an  empty  space  is  a  stage 
technician while he is actually an actor playing his part in the costume of a technician. 
Or  assume that you are sitting on a bank in a street and someone passing by attracts 
your attention and you look at the way s/he moves very carefully.  S/he can either be 
aware or unaware of your gaze and either be a performance artist performing in the 
street or someone going to work. In which conditions should we define it as belonging 
to the category of performing arts?  Someone crying in the middle of the street may be 
watched by many people and some people may try to help that person while the others 
may pass by glancing.  If the one crying is a performer and if some people try to help 
him/her and then move away from him/her without any acknowledgment of the event as 
performance, can we still call it performance? Or if some people somehow realized that 
it is a performance, can we say that it is performance for some of them and not for the 
others?  
All of these possibilities can be multiplied and can get more complicated .  Each 
assumption will increase the confusion about how theater and/or performance art should 
be  defined.  To  an  extent,  Schechner's  distinction  between  'as  performance'  and  'is 
performance' clarify the discussion above. Schechner (2002) states that the performing 
arts  are performances,  but  “any  action  can  be  studied   as performance”.   When 
everyday  practices  and  regular  life  are  assessed  via  the  concepts  theatricality  and 
performativity, everything can be studied  as  performance.  The metaphor of theatrum 
mundi that “all the world is a stage” which Shakespeare wrote in his play As You Like It  
is  actually  another  way  of  saying  “anything  can  be  studied  as  performance”.  The 
concept performance becomes the framework for analysis, thus the statement “anything 
can be studied as performance” is more than being a mere description or definition. 
Marking and framing an action as performance transforms the action into performance. 
In other words, anything can be received as performance.  However, performativity in 
everyday life is different than it is in performance arts. We can think of a very simple, 
everyday act like brushing our teeth.  A performer can choose to perform the act of 
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brushing.  However, there should be something that separates the act of brushing  in 
performance from the act of brushing in everyday life.  What separates an action in 
performance  from the  everyday  life  is  the  frame  of  an  action  which  says  “this  is 
performance”. Thus, we can say that the performer acts out the act of brushing. What 
distinguishes an everyday action from an everyday action in performance is then this 
performative gesture:  
Happenings, a term coined by Alan Kaprow in the late 1950's, define an art  
form in  which  the  action  is  extracted  from the  environment,  replacing  the  
traditional art object with a performative gesture rooted in the movements of  
everday life.
For something to be called  as theatre or performance,  I  think it  should define and 
display itself as theatre and performance.  Yet, I do not talk about different styles within 
theater,  like  Brechtian  distancing or  alienation effect.  I  am talking about  theater  or 
performance  art  in  general.  The  frame  of  a  performance  as  'this  is  performance'  is 
determined by the stage, text, tickets, costumes, scenery, and performers.  Even if all of 
these elements are missing, performative gesture will communicate the message “this is 
a performance”.   Bateson (1972) indicates that he had encountered two young monkeys 
playing at the zoo.  The way these two monkeys interacted with each other was very 
similar to combat or fight.  However, he says it was obvious that they were not fighting 
with each other, so it was 'not combat', they were playing.  Bateson (1972) says that 
play  is  possible  only  when  the  participants  exchange  the  message  'this  is  play'. 
“Expanded, the statement 'this is play' looks something like this: 'These actions in which 
we now engage do not denote what those actions for which they stand would denote'” 
(Bateson, p.180).  The actions of monkeys stand for combat while these actions do not 
denote combat.  The signal 'this is play' is exchanged between them and as observers we 
also receive the message 'this is play'.  (Bateson, 1972).  In normal conditions, to be 
bitten is painful and thus the bite is used for defense and attack, but the transmission of 
the signal 'this is play' through the playful bite causes the monkeys to receive the bite on 
the basis of 'as if'. When one of the monkeys bites the other to invite him to play, the 
other  one  receives  the  implicit  message  that  he  is  not  bitten  to  be  defeated  and as 
viewers we also get the signal that they are not fighting but playing. Bateson says “...it 
is evident to the human observer that to the participant monkeys this was not combat” 
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(Bateson, p.179).  Then the frame transforms the action into something other than itself. 
The bite is received as if it is a bite by the observers and participants: “Not only does the 
playful nip not denote what would be denoted by the bite for which it stands, but, in 
addition, the bite itself is fictional” (Bateson, p.182).  Because the bite is perceived as if 
it is a bite, it is fictional.  Yet, monkeys do not play to exhibit or present their play. 
Human-beings also do not play for the purpose of exhibition.  For instance, children 
play with their toys, but they do not exhibit their play to the others as performance. 
They may be playing for the satisfaction of their fantasies or their fantasies may be 
emerging as the result of the act of playing. For whatever reason animals and human-
beings play, they do not play for the sake of exhibition or presentation of what they 
play.  When human-beings play to exhibit what they play, their play transforms into 
performance.  Thus, other than transmitting the message 'this is play', performance art 
should transmit the message 'this is play which is exhibited as play' or shortly 'this is 
performance'.  Also this message should be received by the viewers.  Thus, whether the 
empty space Brooks mention is a classical stage or street, something is performance 
only when an actor or performer walks across an empty space when there is someone 
watching him with the knowledge that he is performing. I think the awareness of the 
fact  that  'this  is  performance'  both  by  the  performer  and  viewer  is  necessary  for 
something  to  be  called  as  performance.   Thus,  the  distinction  between art  and  life 
should be  maintained. I think the space which the frame that separates everyday life 
from  performance  makes  performers  and  viewers  to  receive  the  performance  at  a 
distinct level of consciousness from that of everyday life. I think Beckett creates this 
space  by  staging  itself  as  a  performance  through  performing  the  constructive  and 
performative aspects of language and the body.  
I will analyze the plays based on the theatrical productions of the play as well as 
using the texts. More than being written to read, Beckett's plays are written to be staged. 
This is of course valid for all  the plays,  but the plays of Beckett  as an author who 
created an independent theatrical language through transforming language into the body 
and  the  body  into  language  should  be  analyzed  on  stage  since  there  are  many 
parenthesis  defining  the  movements  of  performers.   The  bodily  movements  strictly 
defined as stage directions by Beckett are necessary to watch to get a complete sense of 
what Beckett does as a writer.   Beckett's ways of using human body on stage is an 
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important  part  of  his  theatrical  language.  The  language  Beckett  creates  through the 
visuality of the bodily actions lies at the core of his distinct theatrical language. Thus, 
one can say that Beckett's plays are required to be seen on stage more than the classical 
plays which have a certain theme, plot and unified characters. 
4.2  Not I
Beckett's  Not I  operates through 'schizo-logic", because the text resists being assigned 
any definite, single meaning.  Beckett effaces the distinction between the self and the 
other and thus overlaps many possibilities in terms of meaning.  In other words, distinct 
possibilities of meaning exist together in the play.  Beckett's text prevents the reader 
from  staying  within  the  constraints  of  meaning  and  representation  by  continuously 
deconstructing itself in the existence of multiple identities.  Other than the multiplication 
of  identities  through  the  loss  of  distinction  between  the  self  and  the  other,  Beckett 
prevents the reader from staying within the constrains of meaning and representation 
through the  materiality of words.  By making the materiality of words exist together 
with  different meanings, the text effaces the distinction between the body and language. 
Through making language material,  the text stages the constructive and performative 
aspects of language.
How does  Beckett  efface  the  distinction  between  the  self  and  the  other?   In 
Beckett's  short  play,  there  are  the  mouth  speaking  on  the  stage  and  the  auditor 
downstage. Beckett describes the auditor as "dead still  throughout but for four brief 
movements where indicated". In the text, there are four places where the mouth says: "– 
. . . what? . . who? . . no! . . she! . . [Pause and movement]".  It is the auditor who does 
the movement in the paranthesis.   Beckett explains the movement in Not I (1972/1993) 
as follows:
Movement: this consists in simple sideways raising of arms from sides and their falling  
back, in a gesture  of  helpless  compassion.  It  lessens  with  each  recurrence  till  
scarcely perceptible at third. There is just  enough  pause  to  contain  it  as  MOUTH  
recovers from vehement refusal to relinquish third person.
(Beckett, p.236)
The  movement  that  the  auditor  does  comes  right  after  the  mouth's 
"what?....who?.....no!.....she!....".  Beckett's stage direction which says there should be 
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"enough pause to contain it as mouth recovers from vehement refusal to relinquish third 
person" clearly shows that the mouth refuses that it is actually talking about itself. The 
mouth talks about 'she', however the mouth talks about itself while referring to the third 
person.  When the mouth says  "what?....who?.....no!.....she!....",  it is as if the mouth 
asserts that the person it is referring to is not itself but someone else. In other words, the 
mouth  refuses  to  leave  third-person  narration.  The  mouth  says  "no  idea  what  she's 
saying...and can't stop" while it is the mouth itself who cannot stop and have any control 
over itself.  The mouth says "whole body like gone...just the mouth..." while referring to 
the third person, but it  is the mouth whose whole body is gone and who is just the 
mouth.  The mouth is talking about itself while using the pronoun 'she' or 'her'. It cannot 
distinguish between itself and the other.  In the text, 'she' becomes equal to 'I'.   
How does the loss of distinction between the self and the other in Beckett's short 
play prevent the text from being reduced to a definite, single meaning and open the text 
to the coexistence of many possibilities in terms of meaning?  In Not I, the mouth tells 
the story of a woman in her seventies wandering in a field to find cowslips to make a 
ball in  an early  April  morning  light,  but  suddenly the mouth  says  "what?  ...who?.. 
.no!...she!" and the woman finds herself in the dark.
...drifting around . . . when suddenly . . . gradually . . . all went out . . . all  
that early April morning light .  .  .  and she found herself  in the--– .  .  .  
what? . . who? . . no! . . she! . . [Pause and movement 1.] . . . found herself  
in the dark.  (Beckett, p.237)
The loss of reality, the reality of an early april morning light, by finding herself in the 
dark and the fragmentation that the woman in the story experiences intersects with the 
fragmentation that the mouth experiences while telling the story of the woman.  While 
telling the story of the woman, the mouth suddenly says "what? .  .  who? . .  no! .  .  
she!"  and continues to tell the story as follows: 
. . . in the ears . . . and a ray of light came and went . . . came and went . . .  
such as ......the moon might cast .... . drifting . . . in and out of cloud . .  
. but so dulled . . . feeling . . . feeling so dulled .  .  .  she  ......did  not  
know ..... . . what position she was in . . . imagine!  .  .  what  position  
she was in! . . whether standing . . . or ......sitting . . . but the brain– 
. . . what?. . kneeling? . . yes . . . whether standing . . . or sitting . . . or  
kneeling . .  but the brain– . . . what?  .  .  lying?  .  .  yes  .  .  whether  
standing . . . or sitting . . . or kneeling . . . or  lying  .  .  .   (Beckett,  
p.237)
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There are five possibilities and combinations of different meanings in this part. First of 
all,  the mouth could be telling the story of the woman but suddenly the mouth gets 
fragmented on the stage and jumps to the present time of telling the story on the stage. 
At the present time, the mouth is on a dark stage  where the light falls on itself and 
because it is only a mouth, it cannot know whether it is standing, kneeling or sitting: 
"...found  herself  in  the  dark...what  position  she  was  in!....whether  standing....or 
sitting....or kneeling...or lying" (Beckett, p.237).  Secondly, the mouth could be telling 
its own story by using third-person narration like she (the mouth) was once wandering 
in a field and suddenly found herself in the dark in the field and could not know what 
position she was in, in the field.  The third possibility is that the mouth could be telling 
its own story by referring to the past time as it was once wandering in the field, but 
suddenly  the  mouth  finds  herself  in  the  dark  on  the  stage  at  the  present  time  and 
detaches from reality so that the mouth cannot know which position it is in on the stage. 
The fourth possibility is that the mouth could be telling the story of the woman who 
really -without detaching from reality-  finds herself in the dark while wandering in the 
field.  Lastly, the mouth could be telling the story of the woman who while wandering 
in the field suddenly gets detached from the reality of the field. All these possibilities 
exist together without excluding each other.  The loss of the distinction between the 
mouth and the woman in the text multiplies the meaning of the text. The coexistence of 
distinct possibilities and/or different meanings prevents the reader from searching for 
metaphors, analogies and symbols.  According to Deleuze, to make meaning indefinite 
and to find out how new connections form and then break down in a text, one should 
not ask the meaning of the text or what the text actually represents. Beckett's language 
does not permit the reader to understand and interpret the text. Everytime the reader 
feels closer to any stable or coherent meaning in Beckett's  Not I, the text transforms 
itself into something different through the distinct possibilities that the text produces. 
   While reading  Beckett's Not I, we cannot distinguish between the mouth and the 
woman in the story.  The mouth continuously transforms itself into the other. There is 
no subject that can distinguish itself from the object, there is no inside that excludes the 
outside and there is no self through which the other is situated.  The mouth is a body 
orifice, thus what is outside can go inside and what is inside can go outside through the 
mouth.  Winnicot (1971/1997) indicates that the child sucks his/her mother's breast as if 
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the breast belongs to himself/herself and the mother gives milk to the baby as if the 
baby is part of her own body. Then the mouth is the site of unification between the two 
bodies  that  cannot  separate  one  from the  other.   The  mother-infant  dependency  is 
important, because schizophrenia results from the failure of separation from the mother. 
In  infantile  language,  the  other  becomes  I  and  I  becomes  the  other.  Schizophrenic 
communication  with  all  the  repetitions,  pauses,  silences,  fragmented  sentences,  and 
discontinuities is poetic and child-like. Similarly,  Not I  is a play with long silences, 
pauses, fragmented sentences and repetitions.
 Can  we  talk  about  pure  material  signifiers,  signifiers  in  isolation,  loss  of 
signifieds or the breakdown of relationship among signifiers in Not I?  Since the result 
of the breakdown of relationship among signifiers  is the effacement of meaning,  is 
there a loss of meaning in  Not I?   Jameson reminds the reader that he uses the word 
schizophrenia in a  descriptive and metaphorical sense, not in clinical terms. What does 
Jameson mean by saying "schizophrenic writing in descriptive but not in diagnostic 
sense"  (Jameson,  1998,  p.135)?   He gives  an  example  of  the  poem  China by  Bob 
Perelman in terms of schizophrenic writing and he states: “One may object that this is 
not exactly schizophrenic writing in the clinical sense; it does not seem quite right to 
say  that  these  sentences  are  free-floating  material  signifiers  whose  signifieds  have 
evaporated.” (Jameson, p.140).                                                                     
It  cannot  be  claimed  that  the  meaning  is  completely  lost  or  that  it  is  not 
transmitted to the reader.   Then what similarities do Beckett's text and schizophrenic 
writing in literary context share? .   Schizophrenic language in literary context contains 
the features of schizophrenic language in the clinical  sense,  but at  the same time it 
displays the existence of these features.  Thus, the meaning in schizophrenic language in 
a literary text arises from the exhibition of these features. In other words, there is a 
breakdown in the signifying chain but at the same time, this breakdown is displayed as a 
breakdown.  The basic thing that connects the signifiers in isolation and that in a way 
reconstructs the relationship among signifiers in literary schizophrenic language is this 
act of referring to its own fragmentation. Through displaying this breakdown, meaning 
is reconstructed. The same could be claimed for Beckett's  Not I. The examples below 
display how the mouth in Not I refers to its own fragmentation:
her lips moving . . . imagine! . . her lips moving! . . as of course till then she 
36
had not . . . and not alone the lips .  .  the cheeks .  .  .  the jaws .  .  .  the  
whole face . . . all those– . . what?. . the tongue? .  .  yes .  .  .  the tongue in  
the mouth...   (Beckett, p. 240)
whole body like gone . . . just the mouth . . . lips . . . cheeks . . . jaws . . . never– 
. . what?. . tongue? . . yes . . . lips. . . cheeks . . . jaws . . .  tongue .  .  .  
never still a second . . . mouth on fire . . . stream of words . .  .  in  
her ear . . .   (Beckett, p.241)
and the whole brain begging . . . something begging in the brain . . . begging 
the mouth to stop...   (Beckett, p. 241)     
and the brain . . . raving away on its own...  (Beckett, p.241)
According to Lacan, the superiority of the sense of sight of an infant over other 
senses  is  important  for  him/her  to  construct  a  body-image of  himself/herself  in  the 
mirror stage.  When the child looks at the mirror, s/he sees herself/himself as having a 
coordinated body, but in reality, the infant does not have motor coordination:" ...the 
infant  experiences  its  body  as  consisting  of  discrete  parts  without  a  sense  of  their 
interrelation...at one moment as a hand, at another as a foot, a leg, or an arm".
(Welton,  1999,  p.234).  As  it  is  clearly  seen  in  the  quotations  above,  the  body  is 
fragmented into lip, ear, cheek, jaw, tongue, brain, and face.  These fragmented parts 
cannot form a unified body image.  It is as if all parts of the body are experienced as 
discrete parts. For instance, the brain begs the mouth to stop.  However, the mouth is 
aware of the bodily fragmentation that it experiences to the extent that it can refer to its 
own fragmentation and this referral constructs a new meaning. Thus instead of claiming 
that the play is devoid of meaning,  it  should be said that it  is devoid of single and 
coherent meaning. 
  In Beckett's play, there is nothing on the stage other than the speaking mouth. 
The mouth as a character is made up of words.  The mouth can utter words only through 
the bodily action of the tongue and lips. The movement of the tongue and lips enable the 
sound to come out as a meaningful word. The mouth can speak to the extent that it acts. 
Language is the only action of the mouth whose existence is dependent on the sound it 
makes,  whether  the  sound  comes  out  as  a  scream,  laughter  or  word.  By  making 
language a bodily action, Beckett transforms language into the body and by making 
language the only action of the mouth,  he transforms the body into language.   The 
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words are physical and material since the movement of the tongue and lips enable the 
words to exist. Also, the mouth as a part of the body has a language since it speaks.  Not 
I is a play which stages the coexistence of the corporeality of language and language of 
corporeality.   By showing language  as  the  action  of  the  mouth,  Beckett  stages  the 
performative aspect of language.  Language is an action that does something.  Isolation 
of a speaking mouth without much difference of what the mouth says is a simple and 
clever way of expressing language as an action.
The sole existence of a speaking mouth is not natural.  It is impossible to face a 
speaking mouth which does not have a body in everyday life.  It is this unnaturality that 
transmits the message that  Not I  is a play.  There is not any coherent story, definite 
meaning and any character through which the audience can have the illusion of reality. 
From beginning to the end of the play, it is impossible for the audience to forget that it 
is a performance which they are watching.  The stylized scenery and setting also helps 
preventing any illusion. Ionesco defines this as showing the strings of the puppets rather 
than hiding them.  The frame created through the play saying 'this  is  performance' 
changes the way the audience receives the play.   Other than being staged,  the play 
stages itself as a play through the unnaturality of the dark stage except for the mouth. 
 The relation between the words is constituted on the basis of the rhythm of the 
text. It is as if the text is written by the words instead of an author.  Telling a coherent 
story  with  a  beginning,  and  an  end gives  the  sense  of  an  unified  subject  who had 
decided on what s/he is going to say while telling the story.  It seems as if the speaker 
has a total control over his/her words.  However when the story is absent and when 
there are fragmented sentences with a rhythmical pattern, the illusion of total control 
gets lost. In other words, the words gain their authority back from the author.  Not I 
reveals  that  all  the  fragmented  and   unrelated  words  cannot  be  decided  on  before 
starting to talk.  It  is the act of speaking which determines the sentence flow.  The 
musicality and poetic language in the play show that other than the meaning of the 
words,  it  is the materiality of the words that make them combine in a certain way. 
Below are some parts taken from the play to show how the rhythm and musicality of the 
words dominate the sentence flow.
but so dulled . . . feeling . . . feeling so dulled . . . she did not know . . . what 
position she  was in . . . imagine! .  .  what position she was in! .  .  whether  
standing . . . or sitting . . . but the brain– . . . what?. . kneeling? . . yes .  
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whether standing . . . or sitting . . . or kneeling .  ..but the brain– . . . what?  
lying? . . yes . . whether standing . . . or sitting . . . or kneeling . 
..as foolish . . . was perhaps not so foolish . . . after all . . . so on . . . all that . 
vain reasonings . . . till another thought . . . oh long after . . . sudden flash . 
. . very foolish really but– . . . what? . . the buzzing? . . yes . . . all the time  
buzzing . . . so-called . . . in the ears  .  .  .  though of  course  actually  .  .  .  
not in the ears at all . . . in the skull . . . dull roar in the  skull  .  .  .  and  
all the time this ray or beam . . . like moonbeam . . . but probably not . . .  
certainly not . . . always the same spot . . . now bright . . . now shrouded . . .  
but always the same spot . . . as no moon could . . . no . . . no moon . . . 
(Beckett, p.237)
In the second example, the mouth says 'foolish', but then after hearing the word 'foolish', 
the mouth decides that 'was perhaps not so foolish' and then after few words, the mouth 
says  'very  foolish  really  but'.   Also,  the  mouth  says  'all  the  time  buzzing...in  the 
ears.......not in the ears at all'.  Another similar example is that the mouth says 'probably 
not' and then 'certainly not'.  Other than making the possibilities that are impossible to 
exist together in classical logic exist together  (it can be foolish and not so foolish and 
very  foolish  really)  and  thereby  preventing  any  definite  meaning,  these  examples 
display language as constructive. Saying 'foolish' makes the mouth say 'not so foolish' 
which causes the mouth to say 'very foolish really but'. The mouth changes its idea from 
being 'foolish' to 'very foolish really' as it utters the words.  If we take 'very foolish 
really' as the last decision of the mouth, we see that  the mouth arrives this last decision 
through saying 'foolish' first and 'not so foolish' afterwards.  We  witness each step that 
makes the mouth say or arrive the conclusion 'very foolish really but'. Thus, the reader 
or  audience  witnesses  how the  mouth  thinks  through  using  language.  All  of  these 
possibilities of being foolish exists through language.  Also, “so foolish....was perhaps 
not so foolish......very foolish really but” is a poetic statement, so other than hearing the 
meaning, the audience hear the rhythm of the sentence.  It is the rhythmical pattern that 
makes the words combine in this way.  Some other word than 'foolish' may be used to 
give the same rhythm to the sentence “so.........was perhaps not so..........very really but”. 
For instance “so angelic....was perhaps not so angelic......very angelic really but”.  Even 
if the words foolish and angelic have very different connotations, the meaning of the 
sentence does not  change much, because more than the meaning,  it  is  the sentence 
structure that we hear.  The grammer as a skeleton that holds the meaning reveals itself 
naked without hiding behind any meaning.  By making the structure and grammer the 
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determinant  factor  of  the  meaning,  Beckett  shows  the  power  of  language  in  the 
formation  of  meaning.  Thus,  language  is  displayed as  constructing  the  meaning  by 
Beckett.
 It can be concluded that the non-linguistic elements and the materiality of the 
words form the basis of the play.  Beckett's language makes the text act to the extent 
that the text becomes the gestures of the mouth.  The materiality of the words dominate 
the meaning of the words in the text.  It can be concluded that Beckett makes corporeal 
and  incorporeal  elements  function  together  through  the  rhythm  of  the  fragmented 
sentences, the repetitious pauses, screams, silences and laughters between the words, the 
unrelatedness of the words that do not even form a sentence, the absence of a  coherent 
story  and  meaning,  the  absence  of  a  character,  the  existence  of  a  speaking  mouth 
without the body, the continuous transformation from the self to the other, and the loss 
of the distinction between the self and the other.  Through the materiality of the words, 
Beckett prevents the reader from reading the text to find out what the text means or 
represents or from searching for metaphors, symbols and analogies that signify some 
definite meaning.   The mouth which speaks, screams and laughs on the dark stage is 
what is left over from the play without any story.
4.3  Act Without Words II
The body is the basic design that Beckett uses in his plays.  All the ideas  take the 
form of bodily gestures.   In other words, Beckett converts abstract, philosophical ideas 
into concrete visual designs.  The human body is an irrevocable material for these visual 
designs.  However, the bodily gestures of the ordinary actions are not same with the 
everyday gestures. As Esslin (1999) quotes from Ionesco, when something which is 
ordinary and natural  is staged as a performance,  it  should not be natural  as it  is in 
everyday life, because theatre in its nature is not pure and natural. Act Without Words II  
is a Beckett play which stages this unnaturality.
Beckett transforms the physical and material into language by transforming the 
body  into  language  in  Acts  Without  Words  II.   In  addition  to  what  schizophrenic 
language  does  as  making  it  untenable  to  view  the  body  and  language  as  distinct 
categories, Beckett stages this untenability through the stylized actions which adhere to 
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certain rules Beckett  puts forward in the play.   Because the way bodily actions are 
carried out cannot be received exactly by reading the text, it is necessary to watch the 
play to see how the body is portrayed depended on Beckett's strict stage descriptions. In 
the play, the body has its own text. It seems like the body follows up a certain procedure 
in each movement that it does throughout the play.  The body is portrayed as it is a 
textual production in Beckett's play. Schechner indicates that everyday life cannot be 
thought independent of performing.  Schechner calls the performative aspect of any 
action as 'twice-behaived behavior' or 'restored behavior'.  Thus we usually perform an 
'already behaived behavior'.   Beckett   abstracts  'already behaived behavior'  from its 
context and presents it as the performative dimension of movement.  The play stages 
performativity of the body. However, Schechner implies that world can be perceived as 
a performance and the performative dimension of anything can be explored and studied. 
Does the performative dimension of everyday life erase the boundary between life and 
art?  What is the distinction between performative aspect of everyday life and art?  How 
can we distinguish art from non-art?  I will analyze Act Without Words II as a play that 
puts forward this distinction.  It could be said that Beckett's play stages the concept 
performativity through staging the stylized actions.
As the name of the play implies, there are nothing other than the actions of the 
actors.  The actions which are repeatedly done by the two actors in the play are halting, 
brooding, taking bottle of pills, praying, eating carrot, putting on clothes, picking up 
sacks,  looking  at  the  watch,  brushing  teeth,  looking  at  the  mirror,  doing  exercises, 
rubbing scalp, combing hair, consulting a map and a compass, and taking off clothes. 
The actions of both actors are very similar to each other with some little differences. 
The basic difference between the two is that A is “slow, awkward, absent” while B is 
“brisk, rapid, precise”.  There are three positions that A, B and C (little pile of clothes) 
take throughout the play.  These positions are drawn by Beckett as CBA at the right, 
CAB in the middle, and CBA at the left of the stage.  C stays the same except for 
moving from right to the left while A and B (the two actors) change their places as 
moving from right to the left as BA, AB, and BA once again.  Other than the two actors 
who continuously carry out certain actions, there is a goad which enters the stage three 
times throughout the play.  Beckett defines the first entrance as follows:
Enter goad right, strictly horizontal. The point stops a foot short of sack A.  
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Pause.  The  point  draws  back,  pauses,  darts  forward  into  sack,  withdraws,  
recoils to a foot short of sack. Pause. The sack does not move. The point draws  
back again, a little further than before, pauses, dart forward again into sack,  
withdraws, recoils to a foot short of sack. Pause. The sack moves.  Exit goad.  
(Beckett, p.20)
The third entrance is the same with the first one with the only difference of the goad 
being the longest of all and being supported with two wheels.  It is the longest goad, 
because the two sacks are at the left of the stage and the goad enters from the right.  The 
second entrance in which the goad 'darts forward' into the sack B to the contrary of the 
first and third entrances in which the goad 'darts forward' into the sack A, differs from 
the others in terms of the movement of the sack.  The sack B moves at the first time the 
goad darts forward while the sack A moves at the second time the goad darts forward 
into the sack. Beckett's play may be defined by the existence of certain rules. The goad 
puts the actors A and B in the sacks A and B into the motion through a certain rule.  The 
rule to make the sack A move is to dart forward into the sack A for two times whereas 
the rule that makes the sack B move is to dart forward into the sack B for one time.  The 
second rule is that the actors crawl out of sack when the goad darts forward into their 
sacks.  The third rule is that the actors carry out certain actions when they crawl out of 
their sacks and after the actions they crawl into their sacks.   These actions are strictly 
coded  by  Beckett's  definitions.   After  the  audience  watch  the  actors  A  and  B 
respectively crawl out  of  their  sacks,  carry out certain actions,  and crawl into their 
sacks, the play turns to the beginning where the goad darts forward into the sack A.  The 
same things are repeated; A crawls out the sack, and after repeating few actions that it 
does at the beginning of the play, the lights go off.  The end of the play displays that if 
the play continues it will be the same as the one audience had watched.  Thus, we get 
the idea that the rules Beckett puts forward are valid for all the situations.  If the end of 
the play had not been the same with the beginning, the audience would not know how 
the play would continue if it was not ended.  This unknowability would weaken the 
validity of the rules in the play.  We would not be sure if A and B was going to behaive 
the same under the same conditions regardless of repetitions.  Beckett's rules resemble 
to scientific rules; A will always repeat the same behaivor pattern when the goad darts 
forward into the sack A for two times and B will  always repeat the same behaivor 
pattern  when the  goad darts  forward  into  the  sack  B for  one  time under  the  same 
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conditions provided by the play.  
What do the rules do in the play?  First of all, they prevent the text to be received 
on the basis of meaning and representation.  The rules of the play do not mean anything. 
The relationship between the goad and the sacks as why the sacks move when the goad 
hits to them cannot be explained on any rational basis.  If there were for instance two 
wheels instead of the two people on the stage, the movement of the wheels when the 
goad darts  forward  into  them would  be  explained  by  physical  rules.   However,  in 
normal conditions, the goad cannot make two people move by its physical force.  Thus, 
instead  of  giving  any  rational  explanation  for  why  the  actors  A  and  B  move,  the 
audience should accept the rule that they move and start carrying out certain actions 
when the goad hits them.  It is just the rule of the play that should be accepted as a rule. 
The rules  do not  signify any meaning and do not  represent  any reality.   They just 
construct their own reality which is valid under the conditions of the play. The rules of 
the play are precise and any disobedience will ruin the game. Through making the rules 
the impulsive force of the play as making the goad an impulsive force for the movement 
of A and B, Beckett stages the play  Act Without Words II as a play.  In other words, 
when it is staged, other than the play being staged, the play stages the play as a play 
through revealing the rules that make it a play.  The play makes self-reference through 
the revelation of the rules which makes it a play, so it signifies itself by making any 
signified impossible.  The text which creates its own rules is the only thing which can 
be used while making an analysis about the play.  In other words, the play explains 
itself and prevents it to be explained by any other method. 
The performativity of the body whose materiality is transformed into language can 
be clearly observed through the stylized actions of the performers. What do we mean by 
saying stylized actions? There is nothing on the stage other than two sacks with two 
actors hiding in them. These sacks are moved by a goad which gets longer as the sacks 
move from right to the left.  Thus, first of all the setting is stylized. Secondly, the series 
of  actions  that  do  not  normally  follow  each  other  in  everyday  life  are  performed 
successively by the actors. The actions are abstracted from their everyday context.  For 
instance, the act of brushing teeth takes place in a bathroom or in a place where there is 
water and a washbasin in everyday life.  However, in the play the actor looks towards 
the audience while brushing his teeth on the stage where there is not any water and 
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washbasin. Also, the actor takes out a toothbrush from the pocket of his shirt and he 
uses it  without putting on any toothpaste. Lastly, the act lasts for only few seconds 
which is far shorter than its average time in everyday life.  Thus rather than the actor 
brushing his teeth in a realistic way, he shows the act of brushing teeth to the audience. 
The actor does not make the viewers believe that he is  brushing his  teeth. He only 
makes  us  understand  that  what  he  shows  is  the  act  of  brushing  teeth.  The  other 
important  aspect  of  the  actions  in  the  play  is  that  some  actions  are  repeated 
overabundantly. Consulting a watch is one of the acts that the actor repeats excessively: 
“...consults a large watch, puts watch back, does exercises, consults a large watch, puts 
watch back, does exercises, consults watch...”.  If we had encountered someone who 
consults his watch like the actor in the play in everyday life, we would label that person 
as having psychological problems.  Thus, the repetition of the action would be received 
as a sign for a psychological disorder.  For instance, psychoanalytic discipline would try 
to find out the psychic problems which cause the person to behaive like that.  As well as 
in everyday life, the excessive repetition of the act in a realistic play will also make the 
viewers label the character and maybe search for the reasons behind the act.  However, 
Beckett prevents the viewer from receiving the repetitions as a sign for something else. 
There is no meaning which can be attributed to the repetitive act of consulting a watch. 
The repetitions in the overall structure of the play make the act deprive of its meaning 
which is to learn what time it is.  Thus, the form of the act gets ahead of the content of 
the act of consulting a watch. What is important is the repetition itself rather than what 
is repeated and why it is repeated excessively. This is valid for all the repetitions in the 
play.  
  All the actions  in the play may be replaced by different actions by conforming 
the rules and the repetitions.  For instance, actor A “halts, broods, prays, broods, gets to 
his feet, broods, takes a little bottle of pills, broods, swallows a pill, puts bottle back, 
broods” at  the beginning of the play.   Instead of these actions,  actor A could have 
yawned,  scratched  an  itchy  place,  looked  at  his  clothes,  scratched  an  itchy  place, 
jumped, scratched an itchy place, taken out a mirror, scratched an itchy place, looked at 
himself in the mirror,  put the mirror back, and scratched an itchy place.  Beckett uses 
the act of brooding repeatedly. Thus, the rule is that while replacing the actions with 
different ones, the act that is going to replace brooding should be repeated as much as 
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the act of brooding. In the example above, brooding is replaced with scratching an itchy 
place.  To express it in a mathematical formula; to brood = to scratch an itchy place. 
Similarly, to yawn = to halt, to pray = to look at his clothes.  There is also a second rule 
which is about the act of swallowing a pill. Beckett divides the action into 3 parts as 
taking a little bottle  of pills,  swallowing a pill,  and putting the bottle back.   In the 
example, these acts are replaced by taking out a mirror, looking at himself in the mirror 
and putting the mirror back.  If these actions were replaced by 3 unrelated actions like 
walking,  sneezing,  and  laughing,  the  structure  of  the  play  would  have  changed. 
However, replacing the actions by adhering to these rules does not make any difference. 
Even if all the actions are replaced with other actions by keeping the structure same, the 
play would not change.  It is not the content of the actions that determines Beckett's 
language, it is how the play is constructed.  In other words, the meaning of the actions is 
not important.  The actions do not signify anything and they are not carried out on the 
basis of a certain goal, motivation or desire.  All those actions are nothing other than 
themselves.   They do  not  have  any meaning.    The text  acts  itself  out  rather  than 
representing and signifying the reality and the text puts forward its own reality as a 
construction. The form as constituting the material structure of the play reveals itself 
through the rules that Beckett puts forward in the stage directions and in his distinct use 
of language.  The text puts forward this materiality as its meaning which is actually 
nothing other than the material structure of the play.  The materiality of the play as the 
actions that are organized around certain rules is the only meaning of the play. The play 
stages the materiality as it is constructed on it.  Act Without Words II constructs its own 
reality  which  cannot  be  defined  through  any  meaning.  By  making  any  meaning 
impossible, the play shows how things continuously act out themselves only for the 
sake of acting out themselves.  The actions of the actors are not connected to each other 
by any goal.  For instance, the 3 actions that constitute the act of swallowing a pill are 
separated from each other by the act of brooding: “...broods, takes a little bottle of pills, 
broods, swallows a pill, puts bottle back, broods”.  By putting the act of brooding within 
the actions, which if not separated by another act would together constitute the act of 
swallowing, Beckett prevents the existence of any intentional act.  In everyday life, the 
act  of swallowing a  pill  is  usually  not  interrupted by any other  act  or  even if  it  is 
interrupted, there is a reason that lies beneath the interruption.  The same actions as 
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Beckett writes “...broods, takes a little bottle of pills, broods, swallows a pill, puts bottle 
back, broods” may take place in everyday life, but the reason behind brooding reveals 
itself in everyday life.  For instance, the character may have decided to commit suicide, 
so  the  act  of  brooding  may  be  signifying  the  character's  hesitation  before  killing 
himself/herself.   If the play was a classical and traditional play, the act  of brooding 
between the parts of the act of swallowing a pill would also signify some other reality. 
The act of brooding would mean something more than itself.  If the act signifies the 
character's  hesitation for  killing himself/herself,   the content  of  the  act  as what  the 
character thinks would be more important than the act itself.  However, in Beckett's play 
the act of brooding does not signify anything and does not mean anything. It is just an 
act of brooding.  The actor does not think of anything when he broods, because the act 
does not have an intentionality. Like the other acts Beckett lists one after another, the 
actor broods to show that he broods. In other words, the audience does not watch the 
actor brooding, but watches him as showing the act of brooding.  Beckett abstracts those 
actions from their context.  The way these actions are carried out and their speed are 
stylized.  The actors carry out the stylized actions by facing toward the audience for the 
most part.  Thus, the actions are performed by putting forward the fact that they are 
carried out to be staged.  In other words, more than being performed, the actions are 
shown and presented to the audience in their stylized forms.  Thus the way they are 
presented and staged is much more important than the content of the actions. It can be 
concluded that they are deprived of their meanings through the stylized forms.  It is the 
forms of the actions that we watch not what the actions signify.
 If  we  cannot  interpret  the  play  on  the  basis  of  meaning  and  representation, 
inspired by Deleuze we should ask what the play does.  What does the play do? How 
does it do what it does? First of all, as discussed in the preceding paragraph, all the 
actions are presented to the viewers through stylized actions which put forward their 
own performativity. Through the distinct bodily movements, the actors put forward the 
performative aspect of the body.  If the actions were intentional and natural, rather than 
watching the acts, we would watch their meanings.  However, in this play, we watch the 
way they are portrayed, because the actors  portray the way they are carried out rather 
than doing the actions in a realistic way.  It can be claimed that Beckett abstracts the 
form of the actions or the way they are carried out by leaving aside the reasons behind 
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doing those actions.  It  is  necessary to use the abstraction of ordinary and mundane 
actions  which  take  place  in  everyday  life  to  tell  that  nothing  is  original  and  that 
everything was done before.   The way these actions are performed is also not unique 
and original.  As the actors' bodies which adhere to the definitions which are coded very 
strictly  in  the  text,  the  human  body  follows  an  already  written  text  while  doing 
something. It could be concluded that the performativity of everyday life is performed 
in the play.  In everyday life, people do things, but in Beckett's play, the actors show 
that  they  do  things.   Thus,  the  reason  why  Act  Without  Words  II perform  the 
performativity is that it shows doing things rather than doing.  
The actors'  bodies express themselves through showing the actions rather than 
doing  them.  Showing  doing  something,  for  instance  brushing  teeth,  converts  the 
physicality of the body into language.  Brushing teeth in everyday life is done in order 
to clean the teeth, but in the play the reason of brushing teeth is not to clean them. 
Actually the actor does not brush his teeth, but he shows himself as brushing.  Then, the 
body parts which act or work while brushing teeth in everyday life do not work the 
same in the play.  The ordinary gesture of brushing teeth is very different than the one 
in the play.  It is evident that the actor is conscious of the fact that he is showing the 
behaivor rather than doing it.  Even if  these actions are performed without any sign 
which says that it is performance, for instance on a bank in the street, the actions will 
inevitably display themselves as belonging to a performance through their unnaturality 
and impurity.  While showing the act of brushing teeth, the body makes reference to its 
own movements which it does while brushing teeth.  There is a rupture between the 
ordinary act  and stage act,  I  think it  is  this  rupture  which  displays  the  act  as  it  is 
performative gesture.  Because of the actor using this performative gesture, the body is 
not natural as it is in everyday life.  The act of brushing teeth is also performative in 
everyday  life.   It  can  be  defined  as  'already-behaived  behaivor'  by  Schechner's 
definition.  Yet, it is not displayed as 'already-behaived behaivor' in everyday life.  By 
displaying the body as following a certain procedure while doing something, Beckett 
converts the body into language and into a text.  He writes his plays through using the 
body as a  materiality and physicality  which talks.   The performative gesture which 
shows the act of brushing rather than doing the act puts forward the performativity of 
everyday life.
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Other than using the body as a language, Beckett uses the materials other than the 
human body.   It  could be  claimed that  the  materiality  of  objects  and  the  body are 
equalized in Beckett's plays. The human body as well as the inorganic objects become 
the parts  of  a  bigger  machine which functions  with certain  rules.  The  goad in  Act  
Without Words II may be given as an example to a material which has an existence like 
the human bodies in the play.  The goad enters the stage for 3 times; “enter goad right 
strictly horizontal, enter goad right on wheeled support (one wheel), enter goad right on 
wheeled support (two wheels)”.  The goad is like a character which gives the impulse to 
the human bodies to start their actions.  In the absence of the goad, the play cannot start, 
because it is the goad which starts the play by darting forward into sack A. Also, the 
goad makes the play continue by darting forward into sack B after the actor A crawls 
into his sack. The movement of the goad is similar to the human bodies in the play and 
its role and existence is necessary for the existence of the play. The play that Beckett 
constructs can  only  be  constructed  through  some  materials.  The  human  body  is  a 
material as well as the goad and these materials create visual designs which acts and 
talks.
4.4 What Where
There are 5 characters named as Bam, Bem, Bim, Bom, and the voice of Bam (V) 
in Beckett's short play  What Where.  In the stage directions, it  is written that all the 
characters should look alike.  The voice comes from a megaphone which the viewers 
see on the stage.  4 seasons pass throughout the play.  The play starts at spring and ends 
in winter.   There is  a diagram, a  visual demonstration of the stage design which is 
drawn by Beckett at the beginning of the play.  There are 3 corridors which open to the 
backstage and the actors go in and out of the stage from these corridors that are named 
as N, W, and E. On the diagram, there are also numbers as 1, 2, and 3 to explain where 
the actors should stand during the play.  He defines the space which is enclosed within 
the rectangle he had drawn as a playground.  In What Where, Beckett constructs a play 
which is more complicated to figure out in comparison with his other plays.
The play starts with the light of the megaphone (the voice of Bam) going on. 
After saying that they are the last 5 and that they are in the present as they are still, the 
48
voice says that it is spring. Then we hear the following words: “Time passes.  Without 
words first.  I switch on”.  The lights on Bam and Bom go on.  The voice says “Not 
good. I switch off”.  The lights go off and the voice says “I start again”.  The first 6 
lines of the play which starts with “we are the last 5” and ends with “I switch on” is 
repeated after the voice says “I start again”.  In the second time, the voice says  “good”. 
Then the voice says few lines and finishes his part by saying “in the end Bob appears. 
Reappears”. Then there is a long part in which the characters Bom, Bim, Bem, Bam go 
in and out of the stage as Beckett writes in detail.  This part involves all the entrances 
and  exists  that  the  actors  do  throughout  the  play.  It  is  a  condensed  version  of  the 
entrances and exits of the actors in the play.  The actors by following a rule and an order 
go in and out of stage without saying any word.  After this part finishes, the voice says 
“good”, “I switch off” and “I start again”.  The part at the beginning is repeated and the 
lights go on after the voice says “I switch on”.  Now there is only Bam on the stage. 
The voice  says  “good” and then  continues  talking:  “I  am alone.  It  is  spring.  Time 
passes. Now with words. In the end Bob appears. Reappears” (Beckett, p.325).  From 
this part to the end of the play, the actors talk to each other and go in and out of the 
stage in the same way they had done without words.  Yet this time, there are the words 
as the voice says “now with words”. 
 The play as a whole is like a rehearsal with the voice directing.  The voice directs 
the play and makes the actors repeat the parts he does not like by saying “not good”. 
The voice switches off the lights if he finds it “not good” and he says “I start again”. In 
the first part, the voice makes the actors enter and exit the stage without saying any 
word.  The way they enter and exist the stage is the same with the way they enter and 
exist the stage in the consequent parts.  However, the actors talk before each entrance 
and exit in the consequent parts. After the actors enter and exit the stage with pauses by 
following a certain order, the voice says “I start again” and turns to the beginning of the 
play once more and makes the actors continue the play with words. The repetition of the 
statements “I start again”, “I switch off” and “I switch on” make us receive the play as it 
is a rehearsal of the play we watch. Thus, we cannot watch the actors as if it is the first 
time they are talking. It is like they are following a text and like they know what they 
are going to do and say with some short directions of the voice. It makes the viewers 
realize that the actors had repeated what they say in the play over and over again.  In 
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other words, we realize that every word was said before and every action was done 
before. Actually the viewers witness how the characters go back in the text and start 
again.  The voice says “I start again” for six times in the play.  By staging itself as a 
repetition of what was said and done before, the play stages itself as a repetition and at 
the same time it puts forward the impossibility of repetition through the repetitions in 
the play.  Everytime something is repeated, it starts to exist as a repetition, and if the 
same thing is repeated once again, it starts to be the repetition of repetition and this goes 
forever.  Every word creates something new when it is uttered even if it is a repetition 
and every act creates something new even if it is the repetition of some preceding act. It 
is impossible to repeat while repeating. Thus, it could be said that every  repetition is 
original.  The play  What Where  stages itself as a repetition while repeating the same 
things.  It is as if the play says that it was performed many times before. However, the 
performance that takes place at the present time will always, inevitably be new.  While 
staging itself as a play which stages its own rehearsal, staging the rehearsal as a play 
and staging the play as it had been performed many times before, the play discusses the 
concept performativity.  The play makes sense if it is the repetition of what exists before 
in terms of the  form and content. What Where discusses that as the actors on stage, we 
perform  in  our  everyday  life,  yet  with  one  difference,  theatre  can  perform  the 
performativity  of  everyday  life  by  making  a  self-reference.  In  other  words,  theatre 
reveals the performativity in everyday life. To conclude, What Where stages itself as if 
it is a rehearsal which in turn stages the play as a performance through the voice which 
directs the actors by his “I switch off”, “I switch on”, “good”, “not good” and “I start 
again” statements. 
The play makes us realize that the meaning of the play is elusive or impossible. 
The play puts forward the impossibility of any meaning.  After the voice says “It is 
spring. Time passes. Now with words.  In the end Bob appears. Reappears”, Bom enters 
the stage from N, stands at 1. The dialogue between Bam and Bom is as follows:
Bam: Well.
Bom: Nothing
Bam: He did not say anything.
Bom: No.
            ......
Bam: It is lie. (Pause).  He said it to you.  (Pause). Confess he said it to you.  
(Pause). You'll be given the works until you confess. (Beckett, p.327).
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After this dialogue, the voice says “good” and “in the end Bim appears” and Bim enters 
the stage from E, stands at 2.  Now there are Bam, Bom and Bim on the stage. The 
dialogue between Bam and Bim is as follows:
Bam: Are you free?
Bim: Yes
Bam: Take him away and give him the works until he confesses.
Bim: What must he confess?
Bam: That he said it to him.
Bim: Is that all?
Bam: Yes
Voice: Not good. I start again.
Bam: Take him away and give him the works until he confesses.
Bim: What must he confess?
Bam: That he said it to him.
Bim: Is that all?
Bam: And what.
Voice: Good.  (Beckett, p.328)
After few lines, Bim exists from E and Bom also exists by following him.  The voice 
says  “Good.  I  am  alone.  It  is  summer.   Time  passes.   In  the  end  Bim  appears. 
Reappears”.  Bim enters from E and stops at 2.  Then, Bam and Bim talk as follows:
Bam: Well?
Bim: Nothing.
Bam: He did not say it?
Bim: No.
....
Voice: Not good. I start again.
Bam: Well?
Bim: Nothing?
Bam: He did not say where?
Voice: Good.
Bim: Where?
Voice: Aaa.
Bam: Where.
Bim: No.
            ...
Bam: It is lie ... You'll be given the works until you confess.
Voice: Good. In the end Bem appears.
Bam: Are you free?
Bem: Yes.
Bam: Take him away and give him the works until he confesses. (Beckett, p.329)
Bem asks what Bim should confess and Bam says that Bim should confess that “he said 
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where to him” and “where”.  Bem exists from N and Bim follows him. Then the voice 
says that it is autumn and that Bem appears.  Bem states that Bim did not say where. 
Bam again  says  that  Bem is  lying  and says  that  he'll  be  given  the  works  until  he 
confesses. Bam says that Bem should confess that Bim said where to Bem.  However 
this time, Bam exists from W and Bem follows him.  At the end of the play there is no 
one left on the stage.  The voice indicates that it is winter and after few words of the 
voice the play ends.
The meaning of the play is absent for the actors, viewers and the writer.  Bam 
questions Bom about what he said, but Bom says nothing and then Bam orders Bim to 
make Bom confess that he said it to Bom. Bom and Bim exit the stage together, and 
then Bim comes alone back to the stage. However, Bim says that Bom did not say 
where he is. Then Bem enters the stage and Bam orders Bem to make Bim confess that 
“he said where to him” and “where”. And then Bem and Bim exit the stage together. 
After some time passes, Bem comes alone back to the stage and says that Bim did not 
say anything. Bam says that Bem should confess that Bim said where to him.  Bam and 
Bem exit the stage together and the voice ends the play.  In the first dialogue between 
Bam and Bom, we learn that “he did not say it”.  We do not know whom the writer talks 
about by saying “he”.  The viewers just know that “he did not say it”.  Bam wants to 
learn that “he” said it to Bom and what “he” said  from Bim, that Bom said where to 
Bim from Bem and  that Bim said where to Bem from Bem.  The “he” that Bam asks 
Bom at the beginning is someone unknown, however the other “he's” and “him's” that 
Beckett uses  refer to Bom, Bim and Bem.  Instead of using the names, Beckett uses the 
subject  and object  pronouns he and him.   The questions that  Bam asks are  written 
below.
He did not say it? to Bom
That he said to him? to Bim
He did not say where? Bim
That he said where to him? to Bem
He did not say where? to Bem
That he said where to you? to Bem
The  pronouns  that  refer  to  an  unknown  person  starts  to  refer  to  Bom  and  Bim 
respectively in the play.  As no one says anything in the play, the information that Bam 
wants to  receive,  changes as Bom, Bim and Bem enters  and exists  the stage.   The 
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unknown changes its form throughout the play. There is something missing and the play 
is based on this absence.   In the beginning of the play, this absence is the “he” which 
Bam refers.  However, as the play continues, the pronoun “he” and “him” does not 
signify the absence at the beginning.  What is unknown is unknown in the play.  At first, 
Bam wants to learn what “he” said, but at the end Bam exists the stage with Bem to 
make Bem confess that Bim said where to Bem.  As it is at the beginning of the play, 
something  is  absent  at  the  end.  Even  though,  it  is  not  the  same  absence  with  the 
beginning,  the  absence  at  the  end  is  created and constructed  by the  absence at  the 
beginning.  Whom the person Bam refers as “he” is not known. Thus, the first thing 
which no one knows is who “he” is and what “he” said.  The other unknowns rely on 
this  unknown.   However,  as  the  unknown  at  the  beginning  of  the  play  is  being 
transferred from one character to the other, it changes.  Each unknown starts to differ 
from the previous one and as it differs, it becomes more difficult to figure out.  If we 
think of the unknown as the meaning of the play because that is what is being tried to 
figure out by the characters, then we reach the conclusion that it cannot be attained. 
One year passes and no one figures out the answer of any of the differing questions. 
Also the play ends with the voice saying “Time passes. That is all. Make sense who 
may. I switch off”.  The play ends with a deepened unknown.  As the time passes it is 
being more difficult to find an answer, because the questions differ.  However, the way 
questions  are  asked,   and  the  words  do  not  differ  much.  The  same  questions  are 
repeated, but in each repetition, the meaning of the questions changes. For instance, 
Bam asks both to Bim and Bem “he did not say where?”.  The “he” and “saying where” 
signify  distinct  things  in  both  questions.   All  the  questions  differ  from each  other 
depending on to whom, after whom and when the questions are asked. Also the answer 
is deferred each time a character is questioned.  All the characters look alike as Beckett 
writes in the notes and they face with the same questions, so as the time passes it is 
being more difficult to follow the questions and the answers.  However the viewers can 
realize how the questions override and create one another, because the questions and the 
movements of the actors follow the same rule.  Thus, it is like a mathematical problem, 
if one works on the play, each question can be formulated and expressed clearly by 
changing the pronoun with the names of the actors.  In the end, we are left with this 
long unknown; we do not know if “he” said it to Bom and if Bom said that he said it to 
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Bim, if Bim said that Bom said that he said it to Bom to Bem, and if Bem said that Bim 
said that Bom said that he said it to Bom to Bam.  The last one includes all the others. 
To summarize, we do not know what and where he said it, and if Bem said that Bim 
said that Bom said that he said it to Bom to Bam.  We can continue writing the play 
with some other characters as Bum, Bum2, Bum3...Bum infinite by adhering the same 
structure and as more characters are used the unknown will get longer.  There is no way 
to solve this equation, as we use any character to receive an answer, the equation gets 
longer and more difficult.  Thus, the answer is deferred ad infinitum.  However, the 
answer changes everytime it is deferred by creating new questions. The only way to 
receive the next question is not to receive any answer to the preceding one.  Also, there 
is no way of getting any answer, because there is not any answer.  Everytime Bam asks 
the question to the actors, they answer by saying “nothing”.  The answer is nothing, 
because there is no answer and nothing to say.  There is not any answer.  It is what 
makes us talk without stopping.  
The characters Bom, Bim, and Bem cannot make any change.  Everyone is faced 
with the same question and give the same answer.  There is no difference between Bom, 
Bim and Bem, however the situation they are in differs as the play keeps going.  Each 
time one of the actors exit the stage, the unknown changes. If the characters do not 
change and if they continue to give the same answers to the repeating questions, what 
makes the change?  What transforms the unknown? It is the language which transforms 
the unknown.  Language moves the play.  Each answer adds something to the equation 
“X said that Y said that Z said that...”.  Bam, Bem, Bim, and Bom are nothing other 
than being the variables in this equation.  The structure of language forms this equation 
as it is.  The variables X, Y and Z can be replaced by A, B and C, it will not make any 
difference.   What  is  important  is  the  equation   “....said  that....said  that...said  that”. 
Every  “said  that”  will  make  a  difference.   Without  taking  the  characters  into 
consideration, the language transforms the unknown.  The characters find themselves in 
a  changing  situation  only  when  they  talk.   Beckett  puts  forward  language  as 
constructing the subjects through constructing its own reality.
The  grammatical  structure  of  the  language  reveals  itself  through  the  “said 
that...said that...said that” formula that the play can be reduced to.  Beckett makes the 
viewers and readers aware of the grammatical structure by constructing his own play on 
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a definite formula.  By using which may be named as Beckett's formula in What Where, 
anyone can add more characters and continue writing the play from where Beckett left. 
The  play  can  be  written  ad  infinitum   More  than  the  meaning  of  the  words,  the 
grammatical structure of  language determines the content of the play.
When we look at a building under construction, we see the structure of the building with 
the colons as the vertical elements that hold the building, crossbeam as connecting the 
colons horizontally and ground as the horizontal plane on the colons.  However, the 
same structure  cannot  be  seen in  a  building which is  not  under  construction.   The 
building under construction reveals the basic constructive elements that constitutes the 
building.   What Where may be thought as a completed building covered with glass 
which does not hide the constructive elements.  We can say that there is no one living in 
the  building,  thus  no  memories  and  nothing.   The  only  thing  we  witness  is  the 
construction as it is.  Such as the glass stages the building through revealing how it was 
once,  What Where  reveals the constructive elements of language and language as a 
constructing  the  play  through  theatrical  frame.  Thus,  What  Where does  not  stage 
something  other  than  itself,  it  does  not  represent  anything,  but  exhibits  itself  as  a 
construction.  In other words, it stages itself as a construction through the constructive 
aspect of language. Its only meaning is itself or itself as performing itself.  Language 
performs  itself  without  signifying  anything  other  than  itself.   While  constructing  a 
world, Beckett stages the construction as a world.
It  is  clear  that  analyzing  the  play  through  the  concepts  repetition,  difference, 
deferral, meaning, absence is in a way following the poststructuralist way of thinking. 
Schechner summarizes some key concepts in poststructuralist thinking as follows.
Poststructuralists  regard each phenomenon as part  of  an endless stream of  
repetitions with no “first voice” of ultimate authority.  In their insistence on  
process, poststructuralists are Heraclitean and Nietzschean – everything is  
in  flux...Unstable  “iteration”  -  repetition,  but  not  exactly-  replaces  stable  
representation.  On  the  one  hand  postmodern  repetition  and  
recombination,  on  the  other,  poststructuralist  difference.  (Schechner,  p.126  
2002)
Theorizing  language  as  being  constructive  and performative  is  necessary  to  discuss 
repetition,  meaning,  absence through difference  and deferral.   Beckett  discusses  the 
similar things in his plays. It can be claimed that Beckett stages the constructive and 
performative aspects of language in his plays. What distinguishes Beckett as a writer is 
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in  his  power  to  deconstruct  the  world  he  constructs   through  revealing  his  own 
construction.  What Where is a play which faces the viewer with the constructive power 
of language.  
4.5  Play
Like in all plays of Beckett, the stage design in Play is a necessary element of the 
play to discuss in detail.  In Play,  there are three identical urns in which there are the 
three characters named as woman1 (w1), woman2 (w2), and man (m).  Their bodies are 
concealed in the urns.  The viewers only see their faces which are lighten by spotlights. 
They face the audience without moving their heads.  Beckett indicates that their faces 
are indeterminate in terms of age and appearance, so they seem as if they are the part of 
the urns.  It  is the light which makes the characters  start  speaking.   As the light is 
transferred from one character to the other, the one who has the light at the present time 
starts talking.  Beckett  indicates that the faces should be devoid of feelings and the 
voices should be toneless.  
The stylized scenery determines the form of the play. If the same story was told in 
a  different setting,  for instance in a realistic stage design, the meaning of the play 
would change completely. The large urns are the bodies of the characters. We do not see 
the bodies of the two women and the man.  The performers' bodies are hidden in large 
urns with their faces sticking out of the urns. There are unemotional faces and hidden 
bodies in  Play.  Then, the bodily and facial gestures are absent in the bodies and the 
faces.  However, it can be claimed that the distinct usage of language in Beckett's play 
is corporeal.  Bodily and facial gestures are revealed through language.  How and why 
is Beckett's text corporeal?
The play is about a love affair between a man and two women.  The event that the 
two women and the man talk about is a well-known, familiar and recurring event.  The 
summary below involves all that takes place in Play. 
From the moment when the man tried to escape his tired marriage and odious 
professional commitments by taking a mistress, [events took a predictable  
enough course:] the wife soon began to ‘smell her off him'; there were  painful  
recriminations when the wife accused the man, hired a private  detective,  
threatened to kill herself....The man renounced the mistress, was forgiven  by  
his wife who ‘suggested a little jaunt to celebrate, to the Riviera or … Grand  
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Canary,’ and then, [true to form], returned to the mistress, this time to elope  
with her. [In time] their relationship too became jaded,  and  the  man  
abandons” her. (http://www.answers.com/topic/play-play-1).
There is nothing surprising, interesting and unfamiliar in the story.  It is very likely for 
everyone to hear or read this kind of a story so many times in their lives.  However, 
probably, no one has watched or read this story in the way it is told in the urns.  Also 
not any women and man whose faces and voices are devoid of emotion told the story. 
Then, there is something unnatural  with the way it is told.  In the stage notes, Beckett 
indicates that there should be “a rapid tempo throughout” the play. In other words,  the 
performers should speak very fast since there are no bodies which can move fast.  The 
tempo Beckett mentions is the speed of the way language is used by the characters.
What can be the reason of making the characters speak so fast, unemotionally and in the 
urns? One of the reasons is to abstract the story from its everyday context. Abstraction 
and stylization are the two key concepts which one should discuss while  analyzing 
Beckett's play. Abstracting an ordinary story from its everyday context and telling it in a 
stylized manner creates new ways of thinking, because it creates new ways of talking. 
First of all, there is a physical difference between talking on the chair and talking in the 
urn.  Secondly, the tone, rhythm, musicality of language changes when the characters 
speak so fastly and unemotionally. The unfamiliarity of the tone, rhythm and musicality 
force the viewers to really hear the language.   More than hearing the meaning,  the 
viewers  hear  the  sounds.   The  poetry  of  the  sounds reveal  themselves  through this 
unfamiliar  way of  speaking.   The  way they speak is  unfamiliar,  because there is  a 
discrepancy between the content of the story that the performers tell and how they tell it. 
In everyday life, this kind of an event is not told to the other people like the way it is in 
the play.  In everyday life, there is a harmony and consistence between the content of 
our  talk  and  the  feelings  that  urge  us  to  talk.  For  instance,  the  tone,  rhythm  and 
musicality of language that two people uses, one of whom lost his loved one and one of 
whom got married cannot be the same.  If the one in pain is made to talk like the one 
who got married and the other way around,  there will be a discrepancy between the 
content and form.  How and where the two women and the men talk are not consistent 
with what they talk in Play. Thus, it can be claimed that what, where and how they talk 
is fictionary and stylized.  Since what they talk or the content of the play determine the 
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meaning of Play as well as where and how they talk determine the form of the play, it 
can be  claimed that  there  is  a  discrepancy between the  meaning  and the  form that 
transfers the meaning.  How the performers talk is about the way they use language. 
The  tone,  rhythm and musicality  of  the  way they  talk  determine  the  way they  use 
language.   What  was  said  of  schizophrenic  language  as  making  the  meaning  and 
materiality of language function together can also be claimed for Beckett's  Play.  It 
could  be  said  that  materiality  and  meaning  construct  and  deconstruct  each  other 
continuously in the play.  That is what makes the text corporeal.  
Below are  some examples  from the  play  which  are  going to  be  discussed by 
following the distinction put forward as meaning and materiality.
W1: I said to him.  Give her up.  I swore by all I held most sacred--
[Spot from w1 to w2]
W2: One morning as I was sitting stitching by the open window she burst in  
and flew at me.  Give me up, she screamed, he's mine.  Her photographs  
were kind to her.  Seeing her now for the first time full length in the flesh I  
understood why he preferred me.
[Spot from w2 to m]
M: We were not long together when she smelled the rat.  Give up that whore, 
she said, or I'll cut my throat-- [Hiccup]  pardon –so help me God. I knew  
she could have no proof. So I told  her  I  did  not  know  what  she  was  
talking about.
[Spot from m to w2]
W2: What are you talking about? I said stitching away. Someone yours? Give  
up whom? I smell you off him, she screamed, he stinks of bitch. 
W1: Though I had him dogged for months by a first-rate man, no shadow  of  
proof was forthcoming.  (Beckett, p.171).
The way the two women and the man talk is poetic. In the example above, there are 
rhymes like “flew at me” “preferred me”, “the rat” “throat” and “stitch” “bitch”  as well 
as repetitions like “I said to him. Give her up”, “Give me up”, “Give up that whore, she 
said”, “Give up whom” and “I did not know what she was talking about”,“what are you 
talking about?”.   With all  the  repetitions  and rhymes,  the language  Beckett  uses  is 
poetic.  The tone, musicality and rhythm are the material and physical characteristics of 
language.  We hear the distinct sounds while reading or listening to Beckett's play.  The 
rhythmical pattern of the play determines the combination of the words. It is as if the 
story gets completed by its own rhythm, because there is also a rhyme between the 
speeches of different characters. It is like one character finds out what s/he is going to 
say after hearing the previous one.
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In terms of meaning, what the woman1, woman2 and the man talk about complete 
each other even though everyone tells the story from her/his point of view.  The viewer 
witnesses how the meaning of the story starts to make sense each time one character 
adds something to the previous sentences from her/his point of view.  The meaning of 
the preceding sentences are created or constructed anew when something new is added 
from the other's point of view.  For instance, in the example above, the meaning of the 
woman1's first sentence “I said to him. Give her up.  I swore by all I held most sacred--” 
deepens with the man's “we were not long together when she smelled the rat.  Give up 
that whore, she said, or I'll cut my throat-” statement.  We receive the information that 
the man and the woman were not long together when the woman swore by all she held 
and that she was going to cut her throat if the man does not leave the other woman when 
we read or listen to the man's sentence.  Thus,  after  hearing what the man says,  the 
meaning of  the first  sentence of  the woman1 changes.   Similarly,  after  hearing the 
woman say “...no shadow of proof was forthcoming”, we become aware that the man 
was right when he said “I knew she could have no proof” beforehand.  If the story was 
told by one character to the audience,  the things that we were going to hear would 
change depending on which character is telling us the story.  If it was the first woman, 
we would not know; the man “told her [he] did not know what she was talking about”, 
because he “knew she could have no proof”. Thus, making three characters tell the story 
reveals how the meaning gets deepened or transformed from one sentence to the next. 
This way of telling the story makes us aware of how things can get omitted and be 
understood differently by each character.  Connecting this with Derrida's remarks, it 
could  be  claimed  that  Beckett  shows  how  meaning  is  impossible  because  it  gets 
deferred everytime but also how it is possible, because it is this deferral that creates the 
meaning.
To turn back to the question asked above, what is it  that makes Beckett's  text 
corporeal  in  the  absence  of  the  body?  Language that  is  made  corporeal  in  a  text 
removes the necessity of the physical existence of the body to search for the language of 
the body. Language always involves the physicality of the body. Beckett's  language 
reveals the physicality of the body similarly to the schizophrenic language by making 
materiality and meaning function together.  Instead of only hearing the meaning of the 
words,  we  also  hear  the  distinct  sounds,  rhythm,  tone  and  musicality  of  language. 
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Speaking itself is a bodily act.  For instance, the body gives different sounds when one 
talks from diaphragm, chest or nose.  Language involves all these differences, but all 
those  differences  gets  hidden  behind  meaning.  Beckett's  text  puts  forward  this 
corporeality by revealing it through the form of the play.  The body in physical means is 
absent, because it is hidden in the urns, but it reveals itself through language or through 
the sounds and rhythm we hear while reading or listening the text.  Being in the urn 
itself is a physical condition that makes the body talk in a different way than when one 
is not in the urn.  The sounds that we hear comes from a body which is really in the urn. 
There are two physical things that the actors should adhere to. First of all, they should 
be in the urn and secondly they should talk toneless and unemotionally.  These two 
things which cannot take place in everyday life make the actors talk in a different way 
from everyday life. To put it better, in everyday life it seems as if the physicality of the 
body is absent in the language.  However, a person who sits cannot talk the same way as 
the person who talks walking.  These two physical conditions will inevitably change the 
way one utters the words.  However, because it is the meaning that we concentrate on 
while listening to the other, the different sounds are not heard.  Or even if the tone of 
the speech changes, we perceive it as a change on the basis of meaning.  Beckett, by 
making the actors face these two physical conditions make the viewer aware of the 
distinction between materiality and meaning.  As well as the meaning, the materiality of 
language, the way words are uttered determines the speech.  Most importantly, Beckett 
shows that the distinction between the body and language cannot be attained.  Where 
the body starts and ends or where the language starts and ends cannot be found out.  The 
body and language cannot be evaluated as two distinct categories as most of the thinkers 
claim as they are.  
Thus, maybe it is not necessary to talk about the physicality of the body as the 
physical existence of the body.  The physicality of the body may be the language or 
language may be the physicality of the body.  Then, the statements like theatre should 
make itself free from the intentions of the literature gets invalid.  Who knows where the 
literature starts and body ends?  By hiding the bodies in What Where, Beckett discusses 
this unknowability.
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Chapter 5
CONCLUSION
 
Can we talk about the language of physicality independent of speech or text?  If 
we define this physicality as unconscious, sensual and unsymbolized feelings, is the 
physicality before words the only way to reach these feelings or can it be a way?  Is 
there any way to reach to unsymbolized feelings? All of these questions are based on 
the  perception  of  the  body  and  language  as  distinct  and  separate  categories.  The 
assumption that the body has a physical reality which is independent of language form 
the basis of the questions above.  If the body has a physical reality which is independent 
of language, then the only way to reach this reality is formulated as it is through the 
physicality of the body. I think Beckett makes his texts reveal the physicality of the 
body through language.  However, it does not mean that the semiotic, which Kristeva 
defines as the organization of drives in language or the bodily, non-linguistic elements, 
reveal itself through language.  Physicality of the body does not take place in Beckett's 
language  as  bodily  drives  or  unconscious  feelings.   Beckett  does  not  make  any 
distinction between the language of the body and the words.  In other words, he does 
not use the words as they are revealing the bodily elements.  Thinking of the bodily 
drives and instincts as being the motivations of using language  makes a distinction 
between the words and the body.  It is as if there is something that comes from inside 
the body to the outside through the words.  Beckett may be defined as deconstructing 
the inside and outside opposition.  The boundary between the inside (the body) and 
outside (the language) gets blurred in Beckett's plays.  The body becomes language and 
language becomes the body.  In other words, one cannot make any distinction between 
the two.  It was claimed that Beckett stages the constructive and performative aspects of 
language as well as making his texts construct and perform their own reality in the 
preceding  section.   Differently  from what  Derrida  asserts,  this  does  not  mean  that 
language constructs  the subject and reality.   In other words,  Beckett  does not  stage 
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language as the only reality.   When the body and language cannot be perceived as 
distinct  realities  and  when  the  distinction  between  inside  and  outside  gets  lost  or 
blurred, what does it mean to claim that language constructs the reality and the subject? 
What  is  language and where is  the body?  I  think Beckett  writes from this  loss  of 
distinction as well as writing the loss.
All of these discussions also lead us to question the relationship between visuality 
and language.  Deleuze talks about pushing language to the limits of painful waiting, 
silence and music.  Deleuze's distinction between stammering in speech and making 
language  stammer  also  brings  an  important  insight  to  the  visuality  and  language 
discussion,  because  making  language  corporeal  could  be  explained  through  this 
distinction.  When language stammers, it is being reduced to a for instance painful noise 
or maybe a hysteric trembling.  It is at this point where we can talk about language as 
being visual.  I think Deleuze's distinction between stammering in speech and language 
stammering also distinguishes between the content and form.  For instance, telling the 
story of a hysteric women is different than making language tremble like a hysteric 
women.  This  distinction  also  differentiates  between visuality  of  text  and  text  being 
visual.  For  instance,  we can  talk  about  the  visuality  of  the  texts  which  are  full  of 
imagery and description.  However, saying that the text is visual is as if saying that the 
text is a hysteric women.  It can be claimed that Beckett's texts are visual rather than 
there is a visuality in Beckett's texts.  Thus, as well as erasing the boundary between the 
body and language, he effaces the distinction between visuality and language.  
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